In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning W.P.A.S.
2026 COA 4. No. 24CA1985. Family Law—Allocation of Parental Responsibilities—Attorney Fees—Final Appealable Order—Insufficient Factual Findings.
January 22, 2026
In 2021, father petitioned for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) as to W.P.A.S. Mother sought to relocate with W.P.A.S from Colorado to Ohio. The district court found that it was in W.P.A.S.’s best interests to relocate to Ohio with mother and allocated her sole decision-making responsibilities. Later, on February 5, 2024, the court ordered father to pay mother approximately $1,800 per month for child support. The court issued a separate order requiring father to pay half of mother’s attorney fees incurred in the case under CRS § 14-10-119 and ordered mother to file a corresponding affidavit of attorney fees. The court subsequently ordered father to pay half of mother’s attorney fees under § 14-10-119 in the amount of $79,822. Father appealed the permanent APR order and the attorney fees award. He filed his notice of appeal of the APR order almost 15 months after the district court entered the APR order and over nine months after the February 5, 2024, orders. As relevant here, the court of appeals issued an order requiring father to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as to the APR order because his notice of appeal was filed more than 49 days after those orders.
Father argued that his notice of appeal was timely as to the APR order because there was no final, appealable order or judgment for the court to review until the district court had fully resolved mother’s attorney fees request. In support of his argument, father relied on In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269 (Colo.App. 2007), which provided that orders in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are not final until all matters are resolved, including attorney fees requests under § 14-10-119. The court concluded, however, that Hill does not extend to APR proceedings unrelated to the dissolution of a marriage, given the differences between APR proceedings and dissolution of marriage proceedings. Rather, permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities are final and appealable once the intertwined parental responsibilities and child support issues are resolved, and an unresolved attorney fees request under § 14-10-119 does not prevent finality. Accordingly, father’s notice of appeal as to the APR order was untimely, and that portion of father’s appeal was dismissed.
As to the attorney fees, father contended that the district court abused its discretion when awarding mother attorney fees because there were insufficient factual findings to support the dollar amount of the award and the award was otherwise unsupported by the record. When determining attorney fees and costs in an APR proceeding, a court must weigh each party’s financial resources and consider the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the necessity for the hours billed. This typically involves calculating a lodestar amount, which represents the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Here, mother filed attorney fee affidavits from two law firms that had represented her, averring that she had incurred approximately $221,000 in attorney fees. But the district court noted a number of deficiencies in the affidavits, including that the affidavits did not indicate how many hours each individual spent on the case and failed to itemize the total hours spent on the case, either per attorney or combined. Mother also failed to provide any of her attorneys’ engagement letters or fee agreements. Despite the deficiencies, the district court found that the rates charged by mother’s attorneys were reasonable for the locality because it had awarded similar billing rates in analogous cases. It then calculated a lodestar amount of $204,899 on mother’s behalf based on her attorneys’ billing statements and reduced the lodestar amount by 20% to account for the numerous deficiencies in mother’s attorney fee affidavits. Here, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by using the numerous billing statements that mother provided in determining the number of hours reasonably expended on the case, because it could properly glean from these entries how many hours were expended and whether they were reasonable. But the district court erred by finding that the hourly rates charged were reasonable given the lack of evidence that the requested rates were consistent with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable experience and reputation. Further, absent other record evidence, the district court’s own experience as to reasonableness was insufficient. The record thus did not support the attorney fees order.
The court also rejected mother’s contention that the appeal was frivolous and denied her request for appellate attorney fees under § 13-17-102. The district court was directed to address on remand mother’s request for an award of her appellate attorney fees under § 14-10-119 based on alleged disparities between the parties’ respective economic circumstances.
The portion of father’s appeal concerning the APR order was dismissed. The order awarding mother attorney fees was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.