Beyond the Myth of Election Insecurity

Colorado’s Voting System and the Rule of Law

July 2026 By Geoffrey P. Anderson, Joshua McMahon, Kim Bruetsch, and Elizabeth Marcus

On this 250th anniversary of our nation and 150th anniversary of the state of Colorado, this article examines the integrity of Colorado’s voting process, its statutorily mandated safeguards, and the relatively few known instances where the security of its voting system was put to the test.

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Over the last 10 years, the integrity of US elections has been called into question. For example, in March 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller released his “Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election.”1 That investigation produced 37 indictments and seven guilty pleas or convictions.2 One of the report’s conclusions was that Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election was “sweeping and systematic.”3 Much of the Russian campaign involved social media information warfare, hacking of candidate Hillary Clinton’s databases, and release of stolen materials through WikiLeaks.4 Russia also gained access to millions of voter records through attacks on state databases.5 The attacks probed Colorado’s system, but there was no breach of voter data.6 Russia was not able to change any votes within the system.7

More recently, the federal government has alleged that vote-by-mail systems like Colorado’s are not secure and thus subject to voter fraud. However, Colorado has multiple layers of security, making any type of fraud on a wide enough scale to influence the outcome of an election all but impossible. This article describes the election process in Colorado, highlighting the many security measures in place, and addresses the rare instances of attempted fraud and the outcome of those cases. This is especially prescient as the US semiquincentennial invites more than celebration; it calls for renewed attention to the legal infrastructure that makes democracy possible, beginning with the right to vote and the integrity of the systems that protect it.

Evolution of Colorado’s Voting Rights Law

In 1992, Colorado’s General Assembly set out to improve Colorado’s election procedures. The General Assembly took on this difficult task with the goals of creating uniform voting procedures to (1) decrease voter confusion, (2) eliminate the need for a voter to travel to more than one polling place on election day, (3) provide legislative gap-fillers for implementation of Amendment One’s8 election requirements, (4) reduce voter fraud, (5) encourage increased use of mail ballot elections, (6) reduce mistakes by election judges, (7) increase voter turnout, and (8) promote economy in the election process.9 This legislative process resulted in the Uniform Election Code of 199210 as revised by House Bill 93-1255 (the Code),11 which was modified by Colorado Constitution Article X, § 20, part 3 (TABOR). The Code made county clerk and recorders integral to Colorado’s voting process.12 In August 1993, the Colorado secretary of state promulgated new rules to fill critical gaps in election notice procedures, mail ballot process, and other areas.13 Colorado voters have put the Code to the test, resulting in substantial revisions over the years that have been discussed in previous Colorado Lawyer articles.14 Colorado’s General Assembly remains at the vanguard of protecting its voters’ rights. For example, in 2025 the General Assembly made it a priority to establish various protections contained in the federal Voting Rights Act at the state level. The result was Senate Bill 25-1, the first bill of the 2025 legislative session, which created the Colorado Voting Rights Act.15

Mail Ballot Election Act

As it relates to voting by mail in Colorado, the Code provided for the repeal and reenactment of the Mail Ballot Election Act.16 In enacting this legislation, the General Assembly found that increased voter participation results in more legitimate and better accepted self-government by election. The Act establishes the use of “mail ballot packets,” which include the ballot, instructions for completing and returning the ballot, a return envelope, and, where applicable, a secrecy envelope or sleeve.17 County clerk and recorders are required to conduct elections by mail ballot for all general, primary, odd-year, coordinated, recall, and congressional vacancy elections, under the supervision of and subject to the rules promulgated by the Colorado secretary of state.18 It includes preelection processes and rules.19 For each general election, the county clerks and recorders, or other designated election officials, must send a proposed election plan for conducting the mail ballot election to the secretary of state no later than 90 days before a nonpartisan election.20 Or, for mail ballot elections coordinated with or conducted by a county clerk and recorder, the plan must be submitted no later than 110 days prior to the election.21

For each general election, county clerks and recorders or designated election officials must solicit public comment on the proposed locations for voter service and polling centers and drop boxes if an election plan is required.22 The statute includes the minimum requirements for election plans.23 The secretary of state is charged with prescribing the form of materials to be used in the conduct of mail ballot elections, establishing procedures for conducting mail ballot elections, and supervising the conduct of mail ballot elections by election officials, and may adopt rules governing procedures and forms necessary and appoint any county clerk and recorder as an agent to carry out the duties.24

Before mail ballots are delivered or mailed, or before any eligible voter is permitted to cast a ballot at an election where the county clerk and recorder is the designated election official, the designated election official records the date the ballot is delivered or mailed in the statewide voter registration database.25 For nonpartisan elections coordinated by the county clerk and recorder, voters are recorded in the statewide voter registration database.26 County clerks and recorders or designated election officials record in the statewide voter registration system the names and precinct numbers of eligible electors, together with the date on which the mail ballot was sent and the date on which each mail ballot was returned or otherwise cast.27 If a mail ballot is not returned or otherwise cast, or rejected and not counted, that fact is recorded in the statewide voter registration system.28 This information is subject to public inspection under applicable laws and rules.29

This law also establishes procedures and timing requirements for obtaining a mail ballot in person from the designated election official’s office.30 In addition, it provides timelines for mailing the mail ballot packets, procedures for obtaining a replacement ballot, requirements for first-time voters who registered by mail and are voting by mail, and procedures for casting a ballot when a copy of identification may be required.31 And finally, it instructs eligible voters on how to mark the ballot, sign and complete the self-affirmation on the return envelope, comply with other instructions, and return or deliver the ballot.32 Mail ballots may be returned by US mail, with postage provided by the voter; deposited at the office of the county clerk and recorder or designated election official; or deposited at any voter service and polling center, drop box, or drop-off location designated by the county clerk and recorder or designated election official as specified in the election plan.33 Further, eligible voters may deliver the ballot to any person of the voter’s choosing or to any authorized agent of the county clerk and recorder or designated election official for mailing or personal delivery.34 However, no person other than an authorized agent of the county clerk and recorder or designated election official may receive more than 10 mail ballots in any election for mailing or delivery.35

All envelopes containing mail ballots must be received by the county clerk and recorder or designated election official no later than 7 p.m. on the day of the election.36 Mail ballot envelopes received after 7 p.m. on the day of the election but postmarked on or before the day of the election remain sealed and uncounted, but the voter’s registration record may not be canceled for failure to vote in a general election.37 County clerk and recorders or designated election officials must arrange for bipartisan teams of election judges or staff to collect ballots from each drop box location in accordance with the timing requirements established by law.38

Once a ballot is returned:

• An election judge verifies the ballot by comparing the information on the return envelope with the voter registration records to determine whether the ballot was submitted by an eligible voter who has not previously voted in the election.39
• If the ballot is valid, the election judge records in the pollbook that the eligible voter has cast a ballot and deposits the ballot in the official ballot box.40
• The eligible voter’s signature on the return envelope is compared with the signature on file with the county clerk and recorder or in the statewide voter registration system.41
• If an eligible voter was issued a replacement ballot and returns more than one ballot, the first ballot received is accepted.42
• If a voter timely deposits a ballot in a county outside their county of residence, the county clerk and recorder who receives the ballot must promptly deliver it to the appropriate county clerk and recorder, who must accept the ballot for processing.43

The law provides strict security measures for ballot boxes and voting equipment. Ballot boxes must locked and secured each night with a numbered seal under the supervision of election judges or watchers.44 The designated election official retains possession of the keys until the sealed materials are transferred to the counting place for tabulation.45 When a seal is broken, the designated election official and an individual from a different political party must record the seal number and document the reason for the break.46

Voting machines, electronic voting machines, and ballot boxes must remain locked and secured with numbered seals at all times.47 Each night, ballot boxes are opened for processing, and voted ballots are placed into transfer cases that are then locked and secured with numbered seals.48 The same bipartisan documentation requirement applies whenever a seal is broken.49 The designated election official must also store all direct record electronic voting machine cartridges that contain cast vote data in a locked and secure location.50

The law includes procedures for verifying signatures. An election judge compares the signature on the self-affirmation on each return envelope with the signature of the eligible voter on the statewide voter registration system.51 If the signature is not stored in the statewide voter registration system, the law provides the procedure and timing for addressing this with the eligible voter.52 If the election judge determines that the signature on the self-affirmation on each return envelope does not match the signature stored in the statewide voter registration system, two other election judges of different political party affiliations simultaneously compare the signatures.53 If these three election judges agree that the signatures do not match, this law provides the procedure and timing for addressing this with the eligible elector.54 The procedure includes attempting to contact the eligible voter by mail and electronic mail.55 County clerk and recorders provide training in the technique and standards of signature comparison to election judges who compare signatures under this law.56 Signature verification devices may be used.57

Counting of mail ballots may begin 15 days prior to the election. No information concerning the count is released until after 7 p.m. on election day.58 If a mail ballot is sent to a registered voter and returned as undeliverable, the county clerk and recorder marks the voter’s registration record as “inactive.”59 Mail ballots are subject to challenge.60

Risk-Limiting Audit

The procedures described above contain multiple layers of security to ensure no improper votes will be counted. But Colorado has taken yet another step to ensure secure elections. In 2017, Colorado instituted a risk-limiting audit to check the accuracy of elections shortly after their completion. It is designed to give a statistical level of confidence that the outcome of the election is correct. The risk limit shows the probability that the audit would correct a wrong outcome. Over the last several election cycles, Colorado has achieved a 3% risk limit, which means that if an election has an incorrect reported outcome, on average, 97 times out of 100, the audit will catch that error and correct it.61

Much of the audit process is open to the public, including the generation of a pseudo-random number by rolling 20 10-sided dice. The number is used to randomly select batches of ballots for review. The number of ballots selected is based on how close the race was—the closer the race, the more ballots are counted.62 Bipartisan audit boards count the ballots. If the ballots match the results from the voting system, it can be concluded with a high degree of confidence that the reported results are accurate. In the case of a mismatch, the auditors follow established procedures that may include auditing additional ballots. Since implementing these audits, Colorado has not identified any instance in which a voting machine switched a vote or failed to operate as intended.63 In 2018, the Colorado Secretary of State’s Office produced a video explaining this audit process.64

Uncovering Voter Fraud

Recently, some of the most vociferous complaints regarding mail-in voting involve the potential for noncitizens to cast ballots in an election. The comprehensive processes put in place in Colorado, however, work remarkably well to prevent this type of voting fraud. For example, the Secretary of State’s Office conducts frequent cross-checks between the statewide voter registration database and the Department of Revenue’s driver’s license database to ensure only citizens are properly registered to vote.65 If an individual who registered to vote is identified as a noncitizen in the driver’s license database, that registration is flagged for review. In the past 20 years, there have been only a few instances of noncitizens attempting to register to vote based on false citizenship information.66 In each instance, the attempt was identified at the registration level, and the individuals did not cast ballots.

Other instances of voter fraud that have been prosecuted in Colorado include several instances of individuals attempting to vote in more than one state. Colorado is a member of the Electronic Registration and Information Center (ERIC), which allows states to share records maintained by state agencies and track individuals’ residencies.67 Through this cooperation, at least three individuals have been prosecuted in Colorado for improperly attempting to vote in two states.

Finally, the remainder of the identified instances of voter fraud are primarily individuals who illegally cast ballots for others by forging their signatures. There are approximately 10 individuals who have been prosecuted for voter fraud based on forgery since 2005. As detailed above, Colorado has comprehensive protections in place to identify and prevent forgery in the voting process. In 2024, 2,431,292 mail ballots were returned in Colorado, and of that total, 42,751 were rejected.68 That translates to a very low 1.4% rejection rate.

Colorado has always been at the forefront of all mail voting systems. As a result, Colorado has one of the highest voter turnout rates in the nation.69 Based on the rare instances of voter fraud and the enforcement strategies employed to combat them, Colorado voters should have great confidence in using a mail ballot.

Interference With the Mail Ballott Process

The Electors Clause of the US Constitution confers upon the states the exclusive power to appoint their electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”70 As a result, Colorado has the exclusive power to create and use a mail ballot system. Because the federal government cannot preempt this constitutional authority, Colorado’s mail ballot voting system has never been directly challenged by the federal government. Instead, the federal government has, on occasion, attempted to use its own powers to undermine and interfere with state mail-in voting processes.

The most prominent example of these efforts occurred in 2020 when the federal government enacted policy changes within the US Postal Service (USPS) that jeopardized existing mail-in voting processes. Among other things, the USPS eliminated overtime, decommissioned sorting machines, removed mailboxes, reduced operating hours, and removed the First Class designation from election mail.71 As a result, Colorado joined 13 other states in suing the administration to enjoin what they described as a politically motivated attack by the USPS for the purpose of harming the states’ abilities to administer the election.

The federal court agreed with the states and held that the changes to the USPS “infringed on the States’ constitutional authority to regulate elections and the people’s right to vote.”72 In fact, the court explicitly noted that the actions of the USPS constituted voter disenfranchisement.73 In entering an injunction, the mail-in voting processes of the participating states were validated and protected by the court. This was especially critical, as the COVID-19 pandemic was anticipated to result in an increase in the number of voters using mail ballots.

Mail ballots have a long history of success, and Colorado’s system has been a model for other states implementing mail-in voting. Colorado has proven the security and benefit of its system by increasing voter turnout and remaining proactive in combating potential fraud and interference from the federal government with respect to its system.

Uncovering Tina Peters’s Fraud

Through the 1992 Uniform Election Code, as amended, and the 2025 Voting Rights Act, Colorado has prioritized and taken a hands-on approach to protecting the voting rights of its citizens. As a result, the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme has had a corresponding positive impact on identifying potential voter fraud to such an extent that fraud is typically dispatched in its infancy. Voter fraud is not wholly a myth; but it is not statistically significant and certainly has not been a factor in swaying the outcome of Colorado elections. Notably, the most prominent election tampering cases in Colorado were not at the voter level, but at the supervisory level.

Colorado’s statutory scheme relies on the clerks and recorders of its 64 counties to act as the backstop to preserve election integrity. However, in 2021, Mesa County Clerk and Recorder Tina Peters was indicted on 10 criminal counts relating to election tampering.74 A jury found Peters guilty of three counts of attempting to influence public servants, conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation, first degree official misconduct, violation of duty, and failure to comply with the requirements of the secretary of state.75 The plot was straight out of a B movie. According to the indictment, Peters, along with Mesa County Deputy Clerk and Recorder Belinda Knisley, hatched a plan to create a phony county employee who was present when the Colorado Secretary of State’s Office and Dominion Voting Systems conducted its “trusted build” process—installing disks for software and firmware updates in county voting systems. Peters’s goal to breach security protocols and distribute confidential information on the internet was initially successful. The plot included disabling cameras that ordinarily record the “trusted build” process. In August 2021, the Colorado Secretary of State’s Office learned of the security breach, which included images of the Mesa County election management systems and related passwords on the internet. The secretary of state issued Election Order 2021-01, requiring Peters and the Mesa County Clerk and Recorder’s Office to produce written and verbal communication and video images arising from or relating to the “trusted build” process in Mesa County. Peters failed to comply.76 Following a jury trial, Peters was convicted and sentenced to nearly nine years in prison.77 Peters appealed the conviction and sentence.

Since Peters’s conviction and sentencing, Governor Jarod Polis has faced pressure from the Trump administration to turn Peters over to federal custody, pardon her, or commute her sentence. The Colorado County Clerks Association (CCCA) formally addressed Governor Polis, requesting that he refrain from transferring Peters to federal custody. CCCA contends that election systems and safeguards worked; that a jury of Mesa County residents examined the evidence, weighed the testimony, and convicted Peters; and that, as such, the governor should not bow to political pressure. In its letter, the organization emphasized the strain election officials have faced and urged the governor to stand behind them:

Colorado’s clerks have demonstrated extraordinary courage throughout this challenging period, upholding the law, defending the truth, protecting the election process, and serving voters despite threats, harassment, and intense political pressure. Now, more than ever, they need your support. We now ask you to show that same courage on behalf of the election officials of this state.78

On April 2, 2026, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence, remanding the case for resentencing and noting that “the trial court obviously erred by imposing sentence at least partially based on Peters’s protected speech.”79 Then, on May 15, 2026, Governor Polis took the sentencing question out of the hands of the judiciary and commuted Peters’s sentence, releasing her from prison effective June 1, 2026.80 Criticism of Governor Polis’s decision was swift from members of the Colorado Democratic Party and the CCCA, among others.81 The CCCA expressed its disdain for the decision, writing that Colorado’s election officials were “furious, disgusted and deeply disappointed by the governor’s decision.”82 As of the writing of this article in late May, the political fallout of Governor Polis’s decision has continued.

A second Colorado election security breach arising out of the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election involved Elbert County Clerk and Recorder Dallas Schroeder. The Colorado secretary of state issued an Election Order and subpoenas upon learning that Schroeder made two copies of Elbert County’s Dominion Voting System election server on external hard drives prior to a “trusted build” in August 2021.83 Following Schroeder’s incomplete responses to the secretary of state’s emails and Election Order, the matter was heard by Elbert County District Court Judge Gary Kramer. Schroeder was ordered to turn over the unauthorized hard drive copies, the identity of the private attorney holding one copy of the hard drive, a chain-of-custody log for each copy, and answers to questions sought by the secretary of state.84

Conclusion

In the Peters and Schroeder cases, Colorado’s election laws and regulations were ultimately successful in upholding election integrity, even where the public election officials failed in their sworn duties. As the United States celebrates its quarter millennium, and Colorado celebrates its 150th anniversary of statehood, Colorado’s experience shows that the rule of law is sustained not by rhetoric alone, but by durable systems, public accountability, and a shared commitment to protecting the vote. At its sesquicentennial, Colorado stands at the forefront of voting by mail and election security among the states.

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