Aragon v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
2026 COA 56. No. 25CA1303. Workers’ Compensation—Notices and Procedures—Petitions to Review—Failure to Enter Order Within 60 Days.
July 2, 2026
Aragon alleged he was injured in July 2020 while stepping down from the front-loader truck he was operating for work. After the incident, Aragon told his employer he didn’t think he was seriously injured. He also declined medical treatment and signed a medical treatment refusal form. Later that day, his employer reported Aragon’s injury to its insurer. On September 7, 2020, Aragon alleged he had a compensable injury, but he kept working for six months after the accident. His employer and its insurer (collectively, respondents) denied liability and filed a notice of contest on January 27, 2021. On August 2, 2021, respondents moved to close Aragon’s claim for lack of prosecution under Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure (WCRP) 7-1(C), which authorizes the director of workers’ compensation (director) to close a claim where there has been no activity in furtherance of prosecuting a claim for a period of at least six months. Three days later, Aragon filed an application for hearing but did not include compensability as an issue, nor did he set the matter for hearing. On August 20, 2021, the director issued a show cause order requiring Aragon to “set and attend a hearing” before the Office of Administrative Courts (OAC) within 120 days, obtain an order extending such deadline, or “otherwise resolv[e] this order.” The director later extended the 120-day deadline to August 30, 2022. Ultimately, on March 10, 2025, the director closed the claim under CRS § 8-43-207(1)(n) because, by September 9, 2022, Aragon had neither requested an extension of the August 2022 deadline nor attended an OAC hearing (the supplemental order). Aragon filed a petition for review of the director’s supplemental order with the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO). An ICAO Panel (panel) concluded that, under § 8-43-301(11), it lost authority to decide the appeal on June 23, 2025, which was 60 days after the date of the director’s record transmittal notice.
As an initial matter on appeal, Aragon questioned the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Section 8-43-301(11) provides that if the panel does not rule on a director’s order within 60 days of receiving the certified record in a workers’ compensation benefits appeal, the order is deemed a panel order. The court held that, under the statute’s unambiguous language, once the panel receives the certified record in a workers’ compensation benefits appeal, the panel cannot extend the time for issuing its order. Accordingly, the panel correctly determined that it lost authority to decide Aragon’s appeal by its own inaction and the director’s order therefore became the panel’s order. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over this appeal because Aragon timely commenced the appeal within 35 days of the panel’s order.
On the merits, Aragon argued that the director abused his discretion by finding in the supplemental order that no “activity in furtherance of prosecution” occurred in his case between August 2, 2021, and August 30, 2022. Aragon contended that his applications for hearing should have prevented closure of his claim because they constituted “activity” within the meaning of WCRP 7-1(C). However, activity in a case is not sufficient to avoid dismissal for failure to prosecute; a plaintiff must prosecute their case without unreasonable delay. Here, the show cause order unambiguously set forth the steps Aragon had to take to avoid closure of his case. The director did not abuse his discretion by finding no “activity in furtherance of prosecution” given Aragon’s failure to attend an OAC hearing, obtain an extension of time, or advance his claim.
Aragon also argued that the director’s show cause order and closure of his claim violated his due process rights. An injured employee has a property interest in workers’ compensation benefits, which cannot be taken away without due process. But this property interest arises only after a claimant is awarded benefits or liability for benefits is admitted. Here, respondents did not admit liability, and Aragon was never awarded benefits. Further, Aragon was afforded procedural due process before the director closed his claim. Consequently, Aragon had no protected property interest in workers’ compensation benefits, and there was no due process violation.
The panel’s order was affirmed.