Castillo v. STEM School Highlands Ranch.
2025 COA 88. No. 24CA1046. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Claire Davis School Safety Act—Legislative Intent—Request for Jury Trial—Deposit of Maximum Damages Into Court Registry—Mootness.
November 13, 2025
STEM School Highlands Ranch, aka the Science Technology Engineering and Math High School (STEM), is a publicly funded charter school. In 2019, two STEM students carried out a shooting in a classroom with 29 students, and 18-year-old Kendrick Castillo was fatally shot when he tried to protect others in the classroom. In 2021, Kendrick’s parents (the Castillos) brought a wrongful death action under the Claire Davis School Safety Act (Act) against STEM. The Castillos sought only monetary damages for Kendrick’s death and requested a jury trial on the issue. They alleged that STEM failed to take protective steps when the perpetrators insinuated on social media and the internet that they were planning a violent act at the school. STEM moved under CRCP 67(a) to deposit the maximum recoverable amount under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) into the court’s registry and to have the action dismissed as moot. STEM did not concede liability but argued that the Castillos’ claims were subject to the CGIA and that, by tendering the maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA, their claims were rendered moot. The district court denied the motions, finding that the case could not be dismissed before discovery was complete, and the parties engaged in extensive discovery for about a year. STEM then renewed its CRCP 67 motion and its motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was now moot because the parties had completed discovery and STEM had deposited the full amount of potential monetary damages with the court. STEM thereafter moved to convert the jury trial into a bench trial to address the jurisdictional issue of whether STEM was immune from the Castillos’ claims. The district court granted STEM’s renewed motions, dismissing the claims as moot. The Castillos then moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order in light of Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, ¶ 42, vacated on other grounds, 2024 CO 67. After full briefing, the court dismissed the case and reaffirmed its order.
On appeal, the Castillos argued that the district court erred by granting STEM’s motion to dismiss and thereby depriving them of having a jury determine STEM’s liability. They asserted that the Act’s purposes of providing reasonable compensation and limiting governmental financial exposure should not prevent the full public disclosure and accountability that a jury trial and verdict on the parties’ substantive contentions provides. As relevant here, the Act created a limited waiver of schools’ sovereign immunity to allow school violence victims to assert a monetary damages claim, subject to CGIA’s limits. The Act also allows parties to engage in “vigorous discovery” about the events leading to the school violence. But the Act does not require a trial to be held if a plaintiff demands it. Under Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo.App. 2007), the district court may deem a CGIA claim moot if the defending party deposits the maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA and agrees to the delivery of such sum to the plaintiff in satisfaction of their claims. The Act’s language allowing vigorous discovery before settlement, without referencing a right to compel a public trial, reflects the General Assembly’s choice to require discovery but also to permit a post-discovery resolution in the manner contemplated by Rudnick. Here, the court reasoned that the Act’s purposes of ensuring completion of full discovery and providing meaningful economic compensation for school violence victims were served, because the parties completed discovery and the public information thereby disclosed would be scrutinized by school officials and concerned members of the public. The court of appeals concluded that the district court’s interpretation and application of the Act were consistent with the General Assembly’s intent when adopting it. Thus, the district court did not err.
The Castillos also argued that the district court erred by not reconsidering its decision that the case was moot under Rudnick in view of the reasoning applied in Scardina. However, Rudnick arose under the CGIA, while Scardina arose under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. These Acts have disparate purposes, so Scardina does not control, and the district court did not err.
The Castillos further contended that the case should not be deemed moot because it presents issues of great public importance, collateral consequences remain at issue, and the case is capable of repetition but evades review. However, none of these exceptions to mootness applies here.
The dismissal was affirmed.