Caylao-Do v. Logue.
2025 COA 42. No. 23CA0195. Competency of Juror as Witness—Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment—Batson Challenges—Peremptory Strikes—Effect of In Limine Order—CRE 606(b)—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act Damages Cap.
May 1, 2025
Caylao-Do was a University of Colorado basketball player. While celebrating her birthday one night in Denver, she and a friend took an Uber to another friend’s home. The Uber driver would not complete the ride because Caylao-Do had been drinking and did not feel well. Caylao-Do and her friend then stepped into an alley and called another Uber. While they were waiting for their ride, Officer Logue turned his police car into the alley, hit Caylao-Do from behind, and knocked her to the ground. Officer Logue thought he had hit a cardboard box, so he reversed his vehicle to dislodge it and dragged Caylao-Do along the pavement under his car. As a result, Caylao-Do suffered injuries that prevented her from playing basketball, and she sued Officer Logue and the City and County of Denver (collectively, the city) for negligence. A jury awarded Caylao-Do $579,795.65 in damages, apportioning 90% of the fault for the incident to Logue and 10% to Caylao-Do. The trial court then limited recoverable damages to $387,000, inclusive of costs and interest, under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA).
On appeal, the city argued that the court erred by upholding Caylao-Do’s challenge to its peremptory strike of Juror W, a Black venireperson, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), based on its finding that the true motive for the peremptory strike was race based. The city maintained that the court erred in its Batson analysis by (1) failing to make findings at each of Batson’s three steps and (2) determining that the strike was based on Juror W’s race. As to the findings argument, before moving to step 2, the court did not expressly find that Caylao-Do met her burden at step 1 to show a prima facie case of discrimination. But once the court asked defense counsel to give a reason for the strike, whether Caylao-Do had satisfied step 1 became moot. And it is undisputed that the city offered race neutral reasons for the peremptory strike at step 2. Thus, even without making explicit findings, the court had to proceed to step 3 to determine whether the city’s proffered reasons were a pretext for a discriminatory or race-based strike. Further, the court did not erroneously apply the standard for a for-cause strike. As to the court’s determination that the strike was race-based, the court found as a factual matter that the city’s reasons for the strike were a pretext and the strike was motivated by the juror’s race, and the court of appeals found no basis for disturbing that finding. Further, if a trial court erroneously upholds a Batson challenge, reversal of the judgment is not required unless the appealing party shows prejudice, which the city failed to show. Accordingly, the court did not err in upholding the challenge to the peremptory strike of Juror W.
The city also contended that the court reversibly erred because Caylao-Do’s counsel made certain statements that violated the trial court’s in limine order, which precluded evidence of Caylao-Do’s lost future professional basketball wages and of unrelated police violence and racial justice protests. Defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to any of the statements. While a motion in limine preserves a claim that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence the appellant sought to exclude, it does not preserve a claim that the other party violated an in limine order excluding evidence the party had sought to admit. Here, by failing to object, the city did not preserve the issue, so it was deemed waived.
The city further argued that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a new trial based on allegations that Juror S expressed anti-police bias during deliberations. The court concluded that the motion’s affidavit from the accusing juror was inadmissible under CRE 606(b) to impeach the verdict. The “no-impeachment” rule codified in CRE 606(b) generally prohibits using juror testimony to contest a verdict, subject to specified exceptions including, as relevant here, the constitutional exception, which only applies where racial animus substantially motivated a juror’s finding of guilt. The city argued for extension of the constitutional exception to anti-police bias. Reasoning that under the city’s interpretation of CRE 606(b) the constitutional exception would swallow the rule, the court held that the exception does not apply to allegations of anti-police bias. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying the city’s motion for a new trial.
On cross-appeal, Caylao-Do argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the CGIA damages cap applies to costs and prejudgment interest. Caylao-Do conceded that the Colorado Supreme Court determined that costs and interest are subject to the CGIA’s damages limitation in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986), but asserted that Lee was either wrongly decided or subsequently rendered ineffective. However, Lee remains binding precedent, and no subsequent developments make Lee’s holding doubtful. Therefore, the trial court properly applied the CGIA cap to limit damages to $387,000, including costs and prejudgment interest.
The judgment was affirmed.