Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith.

Nos. 24-1328 & 25-1111. D.Colo. Judge Federico. Voting Rights Act—Ku Klux Klan Act—Voter Canvassing—Election Fraud—Organizational Standing—Meaning of “Person”—Video Evidence—Dismissal of Party.

July 6, 2026

Following the 2020 presidential election, Smith, Epp, and Kasun (collectively, individual defendants) formed an unincorporated association, United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP), to investigate what they believed was large-scale election fraud. In 2021, USEIP volunteers canvassed thousands of households and voters to verify Colorado voter roll information. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, League of Women Voters, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, voter organizations) sued USEIP and individual defendants, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 USC § 10307(b), and the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 USC § 1985. The voter organizations asserted that defendants intimidated, conspired to intimidate, and attempted to intimidate voters through their canvassing campaign, during which volunteers—who were sometimes armed and wore badges that made them look like they were associated with an official government agency—asked voters if they had engaged in voter fraud, whether they had participated in the 2020 election, and who they voted for. The district court granted summary judgment for USEIP and dismissed it from the case because it found that unincorporated associations such as USEIP could not be sued under the laws invoked by the suit. Following a trial, the district court granted judgment on partial findings in favor of the individual defendants because it found that the voter organizations failed to prove their claims. The individual defendants moved for a fee award after the final judgment, which the district court denied. The Tenth Circuit consolidated the merits appeal, No. 24-1328, and the fee appeal, No. 25-1111, for purposes of disposition.

As an initial matter on appeal, the individual defendants argued that the voter organizations lack Article III standing because they did not suffer an injury in fact. They asserted that the voter organizations diverted their resources based on media speculation, so any harm was self-inflicted. However, all the voter organizations’ core business activities include engaging in voter outreach and education to increase voter participation. They perceived that USEIP’s canvassing efforts were intimidating voters and discouraging civic participation, thus causing each organization to divert resources from their normal services to counter potential voter confusion or intimidation. The voter organizations therefore presented evidence that USEIP’s canvassing efforts directly interfered with the organizations’ core business activities and thus established their standing.

On the merits, the voter organizations argued that the district court improperly applied Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006), to the VRA and to § 1985(3), so its dismissal of USEIP was error. Lippoldt held that unincorporated associations were not “persons” who could sue under 42 USC § 1983. Here, in granting summary judgment to USEIP and dismissing it from this case, the district court found it was bound to apply Lippoldt and held that unincorporated associations like USEIP could not be sued under § 1985 or the VRA. However, § 1983 addresses individual state actors who violate civil rights, while § 1985 specifically addresses private acts of violence perpetrated by groups like the Ku Klux Klan. Given the differences in the text and purpose of §§ 1983 and 1985, and the legislative history indicating Congress’s intent to target organizations and unincorporated associations with § 1985, the Tenth Circuit found that the meaning of the word “person” is different in these sections, and it held that “persons” under § 1985 includes unincorporated associations. Accordingly, the district court legally erred by concluding that unincorporated associations cannot be sued for alleged violations of § 11(b) of the VRA or § 1985(3). Further, the error was not harmless because the dismissal of USEIP substantially influenced the outcome of the trial by narrowing the scope of evidence the district court considered.

The voter organizations also challenged the district court’s exclusion of a video of statements Smith made at a public event where he said, “If you’re involved in election fraud you deserve to hang. Sometimes the old ways are the best ways.” The individual defendants did not object to the admission of the video before trial, but when the voter organizations moved to admit the video during Smith’s testimony, the individual defendants objected for lack of foundation, authenticity, and hearsay. The individual defendants’ objections were untimely because they did not object to the voter organizations’ pretrial disclosure identifying the video as an exhibit. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), their untimely objections were waived unless excused by the court for good cause. The individual defendants did not make such a showing, and the district court did not make findings as to good cause or waiver, so the objections were waived. Further, review of the record indicates that none of objections to the video seem viable. The court thus abused its discretion in excluding the video exhibit from evidence.

The voter organizations further contested the district court’s determination in its judgment on partial findings that a witness’s testimony about canvassers who came to her door did not establish behavior that could be objectively considered intimidating. The voter organizations also argued that the district court legally erred by not considering the political context underlying the individual defendants’ actions. Under Rule 52(c), judgment on partial findings may only be granted when a party was fully heard on an issue. As discussed above, USEIP’s dismissal from the case narrowed the scope of the evidence that the district court considered, so the grant of judgment on partial findings for the individual defendants must be reversed.

The order granting summary judgment to USEIP and dismissing it from the case was reversed, the order granting judgment on partial findings in favor of the individual defendants was reversed, the final judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Because the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s final judgment and remanded for further proceedings, No. 25-1111 was dismissed as moot.