Colorado Motor Carriers Ass’n v. Town of Vail.
Nos. 24-1017 & 24-1024. 8/29/2025. D.Colo. Judge Bacharach. Local Ordinance—Motor Carriers—Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act—Safety Exceptions—Irreparable Harm—Delay in Seeking Relief—Preliminary Injunction.
August 29, 2025
The Town of Vail (town) adopted an ordinance that barred most vehicles from pedestrian malls. The ordinance excepted high-volume commercial carriers, defined as carriers delivering commercial goods (but not including food and beverages) to multiple recipients more than five days per week. The ordinance also allowed a town-approved contractor to deliver commercial goods in the pedestrian malls. The town later amended the ordinance to remove the exception for high-volume commercial carriers. The Colorado Motor Carriers Association (association) later filed suit and requested a preliminary injunction asserting, as relevant here, a likelihood of success on the merits based on preemption of the town’s ordinances under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act) and the Airline Deregulation Act. The district court enjoined the amended ordinance and stopped enforcement against high-volume commercial carriers. But it declined to enjoin the original ordinance, concluding that the association hadn’t shown irreparable injury.
On appeal, the association argued that the district court erred in concluding that it was unlikely to succeed on the merits and denying the preliminary injunction as to the original ordinance. The association asserted that the district court erred by treating its delay in suing as dispositive. An unreasonable delay militates against a finding of irreparable harm to support a preliminary injunction, which serves to preserve the status quo as it existed before the dispute arose. And preliminary injunctions that disturb the status quo are disfavored. The dispute in this case arose when the association sued after the original ordinance had been in place for over a year, so the status quo was the time between enactment of the original ordinance and the amended ordinance. Based on the association’s delay in suing, the court concluded that it hadn’t shown irreparable injury. Further, the association alleged harm as to only one of its numerous trucking company members. The district court thus didn’t abuse its discretion in deciding that the delay undermined the association’s claim of irreparable injury and didn’t err in refusing to enjoin the original ordinance.
On cross-appeal, the town argued that the district court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction as to the amended ordinance, maintaining that the FAAA Act safety exceptions apply. The FAAA Act preempts most local regulations of routes and services of commercial carriers, but exceptions exist for ordinances involving safety regulatory authority concerning motor vehicles. For the safety exceptions to apply, an ordinance needs only to regulate “with respect to motor vehicles” and be “genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” 49 USC §§ 14501(c)(2)(A), 41713(b)(4)(B)(i). The Tenth Circuit first determined that on its face, the amended ordinance focuses on motor vehicles by generally prohibiting vehicular traffic in the mall areas and excepting certain types of vehicular traffic. Accordingly, the ordinance regulates with respect to motor vehicles and likely satisfies the first requirement for the safety exceptions. In assessing whether the ordinance is genuinely responsive to safety concerns, the Tenth Circuit applied a two-step process asking whether (1) the regulation was motivated by legitimate safety concerns and (2) the record shows a logical nexus between the regulation and safety. The Tenth Circuit determined that based on the legislative history of the ordinance and hearing testimony, safety was a genuine concern behind the regulation. Second, the town presented testimony indicating that high-volume commercial carriers had frequently used big box trucks in the pedestrian malls, which presented a safety concern, and that its approved contractor agreed to use only small motorized carts. By obtaining a contractual commitment to use small motorized carts and banning box trucks, the town tried to reduce dangers to pedestrians and facilitate the movement of emergency vehicles. Therefore, the amended ordinance likely bears a logical nexus to the town’s safety concerns. Because the amended ordinance likely satisfies both requirements for coverage under the safety exceptions, the district court erred in concluding that the association had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, the court abused its discretion in enjoining the amended ordinance.
The decision on the amended ordinance was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the original ordinance was affirmed.