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Colorado Supreme Court

Colorado Supreme Court: Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Board (CJEAB)

C.J.E.A.B. Advisory Opinion 2025-01 (Finalized and Effective April 17, 2025)

April 17, 2025

Background

The requesting judge is married to a woman who works as a paralegal for a personal injury law firm. The paralegal’s firm grants her a stipend for automobile expenses as long as her vehicle meets certain requirements: The car must be black, no more than five years old, and must display the law firm’s logo on its side. The requesting judge and his wife are considering purchasing a new vehicle on which the logo would be displayed.

The requesting judge has asked if (1) the judge may drive a vehicle with a law firm’s promotional sticker on the side of it; (2) a vehicle promoting a law firm can be parked in front of the judge’s home; and (3) the judge can ride as a passenger in a vehicle that promotes a law firm.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether a judge may drive a vehicle that displays a sticker promoting a particular law firm.
  2. Whether a judge may permit a member of his family to park a vehicle displaying a promotion for a particular law firm in front of his home.
  3. Whether a judge may be a passenger in a vehicle with a sticker promoting a particular law firm on it.

Summary

A judge may not drive a car promoting a particular law firm, nor can such a car be parked in front of the judge’s home, for two reasons. First, even though the judge recuses from this law firm’s cases, publicly disclosing an affiliation with a particular law firm creates an appearance of partiality and bias, which violates Rule 1.2, Rule 2.4, Rule 2.11(A), and Rule 3.13(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”). Second, driving such a car or permitting the car to be parked in front of the judge’s home could reasonably be viewed as permitting the prestige of the judge’s office to be used to advance the personal and economic interests of others, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Code. However, the judge may be a passenger in such a car under Rule 3.13(B)(8) of the Code, which permits a judge to accept benefits associated with a profession of the judge’s spouse, so long as that benefit to the judge is merely incidental.

Applicable Provisions of the Code

The applicable Code provisions fall into two categories: those requiring judges to be impartial and avoid impropriety or the appearance of partiality or impropriety, and those governing a judge’s acceptance of gifts and benefits.

First, Rule 1.3 prohibits a judge from using the prestige of the judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others. Likewise, Rule 2.4(C) provides that “[a] judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.” Rule 2.11(A) states that a judge must disqualify himself or herself from any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. It is from that provision of the Rules that a judge derives a duty to avoid the appearance of partiality. See Sanders v. People, 2024 CO 33, 549 P.3d 947, 954–55 (noting that under Rule 2.11(A), a judge’s disqualification is required when “a reasonable observer might have doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”).

Second, Rule 3.13(A) provides that “[a] judge shall not accept any gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value, if acceptance . . . would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”

In addition, Rule 3.13(B)(8) provides that “[u]nless otherwise prohibited by law, or by Paragraph (A), a judge may accept the following without publicly reporting such acceptance: . . . (8) gifts, awards, or benefits associated with the business, profession, or other separate activity of a spouse, a domestic partner, or other family member of a judge residing in the judge’s household, but that incidentally benefit the judge.” As explained in comment [4] to the rule,

Rule 3.13 applies only to acceptance of gifts or other things of value by a judge. Nonetheless, if a gift or other benefit is given to the judge’s spouse, . . . it may be viewed as an attempt to evade Rule 3.13 and influence the judge indirectly. Where a gift or benefit is being made primarily to such other persons, and the judge is merely an incidental beneficiary, this concern is reduced. A judge should, however, remind family and household members of the restrictions imposed upon judges, and urge them to take these restrictions into account when making decisions about accepting such gifts or benefits.

Analysis

As explained in detail below, we have two concerns about the use, by the judge himself, of a vehicle subsidized by the spouse’s employer, and which advertises the employer’s business, a particular law firm. Moreover, we conclude that, even though the Code does not bind a judge’s spouse or other family member, stationing such a vehicle in front of the judge’s home is akin to allowing the judge’s family member to place a sign in support of a political candidate on real estate jointly owned by the judge—an act we have deemed prohibited by the Code. Finally, we conclude that a judge may occasionally ride as a passenger in a vehicle that advertises his spouse’s employer, a law firm, as long as such use is incidental to the spouse’s use of the car overall.

  1. Whether, without violating the Code, a judge may drive a vehicle that displays a sticker promoting a particular law firm.

Rule 2.4(C) prohibits a judge from conveying or permitting others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge. As noted in Comment [1] to that Rule, “[c]onfidence in the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside influences.” Under Rule 2.11(A), a judge must avoid even the appearance of partiality. “Courts must meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality, not merely to secure the confidence of the litigants immediately involved, but ‘to retain public respect and secure willing and ready obedience to their judgments.’” Wood Bros. Homes v. City of Fort Collins, 670 P.2d 9, 10 (Colo. App. 1983) (quoting People v. District Court, 560 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1977)). The appearance of impartiality is compromised when “parties and the public are left with substantial doubt as to the ability of the judge to fairly and impartially resolve pending litigation.” People v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2005), aff’d, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007). Similarly, Rule 3.13(A) specifically prohibits judges from accepting gifts that might undermine the judge’s appearance of impartiality. Thus, although a judge may minimize the risk of showing any actual partiality in favor of his spouse’s employer by recusing from all cases that involve the firm, the judge driving a vehicle prominently displaying advertising for the law firm could, in the mind of a reasonable person, create an appearance of partiality.

We have additional concerns that, in driving such a vehicle, the judge could risk creating a public perception that the law firm would be in a position of influence with the judge. Rule 2.4 prohibits judges from conveying, or allowing others to convey, the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge. Even if the risk is subtle, a judge should avoid giving such an impression. See Tenn. Ad. Op. 21-01 at *3 (noting that, although the risk was subtle, a judge could not permit her likeness to be sold in order to raise money, even if a portion of the funds would be donated to legal aid societies, because the public might perceive either the sellers or the purchaser of the image as being in a position to influence the judge).

Furthermore, under a prior version of this Code, we concluded that a judge risked improperly using the prestige of the judicial office if the judge drove a car with a bumper sticker that promoted the political candidacy of the judge’s spouse. Colo. JEAB Op. 2005-05 at *3. Thus, we concluded that a judge must not display such public support. Id. While we issued that opinion in the context of a political campaign, it is equally clear that judges cannot use the prestige of their office to promote the economic interests of themselves or others. See, e.g., Md. Ad. Op. 2006-11 (concluding that a judge could not properly participate in an infomercial for a surgeon who had successfully performed a procedure on the judge); Utah Ad. Op. 90-8 (concluding that a judge who writes the foreword to a book should take care “that neither the content of the foreword nor the advertising or marketing of the publication will exploit the judicial office or advance the private interests of others”). But see Utah Ad. Op. 03-1 (concluding that a judge could properly participate in a cycling club that was sponsored, in part, by a law firm and could wear a jersey with the law firm’s logo on it when that jersey was worn by all the club members “in settings in which members of the public will not automatically associate the judge with the law firm”).

We conclude that, by driving a vehicle with a law firm’s logo prominently displayed on its side, the judge would risk violating Rules 1.3, 2.4, and 2.11(A).

  1. Whether a judge may permit a member of his family to park a vehicle displaying a promotion for a particular law firm in front of his home.

We have the same concerns about the judge permitting such a vehicle to be parked in front of the judge’s home. As previously noted, Rule 2.11(A) prohibits a judge from engaging in any activity that could create an appearance of partiality, Rule 1.3 prohibits a judge from doing anything that would use the prestige of the judicial office to advance the economic interests of the judge or others, and Rule 2.4 prohibits judges from allowing others to convey the impression that a person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.

In Advisory Opinion 2005-05, which was issued under the prior Code, we addressed the extent to which a judge could support a spouse who was running for political office. We determined that the requesting judge needed to avoid any “activities in support of the spouse’s candidacy that trade on the prestige of the judicial office or constitute a prohibited endorsement.” Id. at *3. We noted that such a limitation extended beyond merely restricting judges from participating in political events. Id. Such prohibition also meant that “a judge should not allow campaign signs promoting the spouse’s candidacy to be placed on real estate jointly owned by the judge and spouse, wear a campaign button in public or in his or her chambers to support a spouse’s candidacy, [or] display a campaign sign or bumper sticker on the judge’s car or in the judge’s chambers in support of the spouse’s candidacy.” Id.

In our view, allowing a vehicle to be parked in front of the judge’s home when the vehicle is prominently marked with the logo of a law firm is akin to allowing a spouse to post a political yard sign on property jointly owned by the judge. Such an action risks the perception that the judge is improperly using the prestige of the judicial office to benefit another entity and creates an appearance of partiality and a possible perception that the law firm is in a position to influence the judge. Such behavior violates the requirements of Rule 1.3, Rule 2.4, and Rule 2.11(A) because it undermines the judge’s independence, integrity, and impartiality.

  1. Whether a judge may ride as passenger in a vehicle with a sticker promoting a particular law firm on it.

We reach a different conclusion with regard to whether a judge may properly ride as a passenger in a vehicle prominently marked with a law firm’s logo. As already discussed, under Rule 3.13(B)(8) a judge may accept benefits when those benefits are only incidental to something given to the judge’s spouse or family member in association with the spouse or family member’s job. The judicial ethics committees of other jurisdictions have determined that judges may accept such benefits by, for example, attending a conference or dinner as the guest of a spouse. See, e.g., S.C. Adv. Comm. Std. Jud. Cond. 13-2009 (concluding that a magistrate could accept free accommodation at the spouse’s annual professional conference, as the accommodation was incident to the spouse’s profession, for the benefit of the spouse and the judge together, and not intended to influence the judge or directed specifically to the judge, but rather to all the spouses of the conference attendees); NY Jud. Adv. Op. 09-74 (March 12, 2009) (concluding that a judge could properly attend a law enforcement conference in a foreign country and could accept payment for the cost of travel and expenses from the conference host, where the benefits were presented to the judge solely as the invited guest of the spouse and were therefore incidental to the spouse’s profession). In the circumstances presented here, we conclude that if a judge occasionally rides as a passenger in the vehicle of the judge’s spouse, the judge merely accepts an incidental benefit, even though the vehicle is labeled with the logo of a law firm. We caution that a judge should be careful, however, to avoid regularly riding in such a vehicle as that would risk the same appearance of partiality already discussed.

Conclusion

The requesting judge may not drive a vehicle displaying a law firm’s logo, nor may the judge allow such a vehicle to be parked in front of the judge’s house because it would create an appearance of impropriety contrary to Rule 1.2 and Rule 2.4 of the Code, and an appearance of partiality under Rule 2.11(A). It also risks using the prestige of judicial office for the economic benefit of another, contrary to Rule 1.3. The judge may, however, occasionally ride as a passenger in such a vehicle because such rides would constitute an incidental benefit to the judge from a benefit associated with the profession of the judge’s spouse, and is therefore permitted under Rule 3.13(B)(8).

FINALIZED AND EFFECTIVE this 17th day of April, 2025.

Official Colorado Supreme Court proceedings can be found at the Colorado Supreme Court website.

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