Cuervo v. Sorenson.
No. 22-1387. 8/30/2024. D.Colo. Judge Carson. Motion to Dismiss—Documents Outside the Complaint—Search Warrant—Fourth Amendment—Qualified Immunity.
August 30, 2024
Mesa County officers were looking for a stolen Sno-Cat, an 8´ x 16´3˝ tracked machine. They went to Cuervo’s property, which included a garage and an attached residence, because they suspected that Cuervo’s son had parked the Sno-Cat in her garage. Officers rang Cuervo’s doorbell and no one answered, but one officer believed he saw someone inside the residence. Officers obtained a search warrant authorizing the search of Cuervo’s property for the Sno-Cat two hours later. The Mesa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) arrived at Cuervo’s residence to execute the warrant. Officers did not try to establish contact with anyone who might have been inside the residence; instead, they fired chemical munitions into the residence. Officers then entered the residence and searched for the Sno-Cat. They found a dog but not the Sno-Cat or people.
Cuervo sued over two dozen officers under 42 USC § 1983 alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. The officers claimed qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating the motions, the district court considered the search warrant, supporting affidavit, and GJPD’s one-page, unsigned after-action report (AAR), which were all documents outside the complaint. Cuervo objected, asserting that the district court could not consider outside documents without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment and allowing the parties to conduct discovery. The district court granted the officers’ motions. Cuervo then filed a more detailed first amended complaint (FAC) that alleged only a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim against 17 MCSO officers (defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity. The district court again considered the search warrant, supporting affidavit, and AAR. It specifically relied on facts within the AAR to grant defendants qualified immunity and dismiss Cuervo’s claims.
On appeal, Cuervo argued that the district court erred in dismissing her FAC on qualified immunity grounds because it should not have relied on the AAR. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts generally may consider only the contents of a complaint and documents attached thereto; documents incorporated by reference; or references in the complaint, when the referenced documents are authentic and central to the complaint. Under Rule 12(d), when the district court considers documents outside the pleadings without a valid exception, it must convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment; inform the parties of its conversion; and give the parties a reasonable opportunity to accumulate and present all relevant evidence. Here, Cuervo did not attach documents to her FAC or expressly incorporate any documents by reference. Nevertheless, the district court found that Cuervo referenced the AAR in the FAC and relied on those facts when granting the motion to dismiss. But Cuervo did not rely on the AAR to establish her claims in any document she filed opposing the motion to dismiss her FAC. Accordingly, the district court erred by considering the AAR in ruling on the motion to dismiss the FAC.
Defendants argued that Cuervo failed to state a plausible claim for relief because she copied and pasted identical allegations of conduct for each defendant and thus did not plead that each defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. A plaintiff who brings a § 1983 action must allege that each defendant is subject to personal liability based on their own actions, and a party can sue multiple defendants for the same wrongful conduct. Here, Cuervo plausibly alleged individual action by each defendant in separate paragraphs and thus stated a plausible claim for relief.
Cuervo further argued that the district court erred in dismissing her FAC on qualified immunity grounds because defendants’ search was unreasonable since they entered her residence without authority and used excessive force. Here, the search warrant did not authorize defendants to search for the Sno-Cat inside the residence, because the Sno-Cat obviously could not fit there; nor did the warrant expressly authorize defendants to forcibly enter Cuervo’s residence without knocking and announcing, or to shoot munitions that physically damaged her home. And no facts within the FAC, warrant, or affidavit show exigent circumstances that would excuse the knock-and-announce requirement. Accordingly, defendants lacked authority for their forcible entry, and Cuervo sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment violation. Further, Cuervo’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct. Therefore, Cuervo overcame the presumption of qualified immunity.
The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.