Dixon v. State of Oklahoma.
No. 24-7016. 1/14/2025. E.D.Okla. Judge Matheson. Title VII Sex and Race Discrimination—Title VII Retaliation—Family and Medical Leave Act Retaliation—Prima Facie Case—Pretext—Economic Reality Test.
January 14, 2025
Walkingstick Dixon (Walkingstick) is a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation. She worked at Northeastern State University (NSU), where she was supervised by Reif. Walkingstick called in sick for two days due to a seizure and listed those days as comp time on her leave report. When Reif received the report, he told Walkingstick that she could not list those days as comp time and to correct the report, which she did. Reif then officially reprimanded her for not getting his approval before submitting the leave report. Walkingstick responded to Reif’s official reprimand email and copied NSU’s human resources director and NSU’s Title IX officers. She stated that she thought she was being singled out for different treatment and requested assistance with appealing the reprimand and filing a formal complaint, and requested that an investigation be conducted into Reif’s alleged harassing and discriminatory treatment. While her complaint was pending, Walkingstick took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) from June 4 to June 25, 2018, due to her and her daughter’s health issues. NSU fired Walkingstick on August 16, 2018, citing her negative attitude and its effects on her department, her failure to timely handle projects, and her failure to properly report time off. NSU then hired a replacement worker. Walkingstick sued NSU for Title VII sex and race discrimination and for Title VII retaliation, and she sued Reif for FMLA retaliation. A magistrate judge granted NSU summary judgment on Walkingstick’s sex and race discrimination claims, finding she could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or show her firing was pretextual. The magistrate judge also granted NSU summary judgment on Walkingstick’s retaliation claim, finding that she did not establish a prima facie case or show pretext under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). On the FMLA retaliation claim, the magistrate judge concluded that Reif was not Walkingstick’s employer and granted summary judgment to him on this claim. Walkingstick moved for reconsideration, which the magistrate judge considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). He again found that Walkingstick could not establish her prima facie case of discrimination solely by showing she was a qualified member of a protected class and was terminated and replaced; that this evidence did not give rise to an inference of discrimination; and that Walkingstick did not establish pretext for any of her claims.
On appeal, Walkingstick challenged the grant of summary judgment on her claims for Title VII sex and race discrimination, arguing that she satisfied her burden of showing prima facie cases of sex and race discrimination based on evidence that she is a Native American woman who was qualified for her job, discharged, and replaced; and that she presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding pretext. In a wrongful termination case, a plaintiff may raise an inference of unlawful discrimination by showing that (1) they are a member of a protected class, (2) they were qualified for the job, (3) they were fired, and (4) the job was not eliminated. Because Walkingstick’s claims are based on circumstantial evidence, the Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework under which the plaintiff has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination; the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions; the burden then moves back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s articulated reasons are pretextual. A plaintiff who satisfies the McDonnell Douglas elements raises an inference of discrimination. Here, Walkingstick alleged that she is a Native American woman and thus a member of two protected classes; that she was qualified for her job; that she suffered an adverse employment action because she was fired; and that she was replaced. She also provided sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to find that NSU’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. Accordingly, the magistrate judge erred in entering summary judgment on her Title VII sex and race discrimination claims.
Walkingstick also challenged entry of summary judgment on her Title VII retaliation claim, arguing she established a prima facie case because less than a month passed between her July 27, 2018, interview reporting discrimination and her termination on August 16, 2018. Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who opposes an unlawful employment practice or who has made a charge or participated in any way in a Title VII proceeding. Here, Walkingstick presented sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of retaliation to withstand summary judgment because her interview with NSU investigators was protected activity under Title VII; her termination was an adverse employment action; and she showed a causal connection, because her termination closely followed her protected opposition. She also showed pretext sufficient to overcome NSU’s summary judgment motion.
Lastly, Walkingstick contended that entry of summary judgment on her FMLA retaliation claim was erroneous. She asserted that the magistrate judge should not have applied the economic reality test to determine whether Reif was her employer under the FMLA. The Tenth Circuit held that (1) the FMLA allows individual liability and (2) the economic reality test determines whether someone qualifies as an FMLA employer. Because Walkingstick only disputed whether the economic reality test applies, and not the magistrate judge’s application of that test, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Reif on this claim.
The grant of summary judgment on Walkingstick’s Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim was reversed. The summary judgment in favor of Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim was affirmed.