Douglas County v. State of Colorado.
2026 COA 27. No. 25CA0175. State and Local Involvement in Immigration Detention—Colorado Constitution—Article XIV—Intergovernmental Relationships—Article V—Revival, Amendment, or Extension.
April 9, 2026
In 2019, the Colorado General Assembly enacted HB 19-1124, which created CRS Tit. 24, Art. 76.6. Section 24-76.6-102(1)(b) declares that requests for civil immigration detainers are not warrants under Colorado law and are not approved by a judge as required by Colorado law, so the continued detention of an inmate under such requests past when they would otherwise be released is an unconstitutional warrantless arrest. The law thus prohibits state law enforcement officers from arresting or detaining individuals on the basis of a civil immigration detainer, and prohibits probation officers and employees from giving personal information about individuals to federal immigration authorities. In 2023, the General Assembly enacted HB 23-1100, which created CRS Tit. 24, Art. 76.7. Sections 24-76.7-102(1) and -103 prohibit governmental entities from entering into immigration detention contracts with private entities and required governmental entities to terminate any existing immigration detention contracts by January 1, 2024. In 2024, Douglas County (the county) filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, stating that Tit. 24, Arts. 76.6 and 76.7 violate both the US and Colorado Constitutions. The State moved to dismiss, arguing that, because the county is a political subdivision of the State, it lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute. The district court concluded that political subdivisions have no rights under the federal constitution and thus lack standing to assert federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause. The court also concluded that the new laws did not injure the county by improperly infringing on the county’s authority, improperly restricting its right to contract with the federal government, or amending other statutes by reference to their titles only. The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
On appeal, the county argued that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked standing to challenge HB 23-1100, asserting that it has suffered an injury because HB 23-1100 ’s prohibition against entering into detention agreements violates Colo. Const. art. XIV, § 18. The county maintained that it is an autonomous legal entity that is allowed to determine, without the General Assembly’s oversight, what types of services it may provide, including whether it may provide immigration detention services to the federal government. To establish an injury in fact, the county is required to show that it suffered an injury in fact to a legally protected interest. Art. XIV, § 18(2)(a) allows a political subdivision to enter into agreements with a governmental entity for services and facilities that the political subdivision is “lawfully authorized” to perform. Counties are thus empowered to enter into agreements with other governmental entities, but such power is subject to the limitations imposed by the state government. Thus, once HB 23-1100 became law, the county lost any legal authority it had to enter into federal immigration detention agreements. Accordingly, the district court did not err by concluding that the county suffered no injury in fact to a legally protected interest and that it thus lacked standing to challenge HB 23-1100 under art. XIV, § 18.
The county also contended that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked standing to bring its claims under Colo. Const. art. V, § 24. The purpose of that section is to avoid confusion and uncertainty in the statutory law through the existence of separate and disconnected legislative provisions. The county asserted that that HB 23-1100 violates its constitutional rights by implicitly amending existing §§ 29-1-201 to -203 and thereby diminishing its rights under those statutes. But HB 23-1100 just precludes the county from entering into immigration detention agreements, and nothing in §§ 29-1 201 to -203 affirmatively grants it the right to enter into immigration detention agreements. Because HB 23-1100 does not amend or refer to those sections, art. V, § 24 is not implicated. The district court thus correctly concluded that the county suffered no injury in fact under article V, § 24, and that it lacked standing to challenge HB 23-1100 under article V, § 24.
The judgment was affirmed.