Estate of Ward v. Lucero.
No. 25-1224. 6/10/2026. D.Colo. Judge Rossman. Fourth Amendment—Qualified Immunity—Interlocutory Jurisdiction—Blatant-Contradiction Exception to Jurisdictional Limitation—Summary Judgment—Analytical Framework.
June 10, 2026
The Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) received a 911 call regarding criminal activity outside a Pueblo middle school. PCSO deputies McWhorter and Gonzales responded to the scene and found Kristy Ward Stamp in a parked vehicle with her 32-year-old son Richard Ward in the back seat. McWhorter questioned Richard, who said he might have a pocketknife. During questioning, Richard put something in his mouth, telling McWhorter it was “just a pill,” which was later determined to be anti-anxiety medication. McWhorter then began to physically remove Richard from the car, a struggle ensued, and less than 30 seconds later McWhorter shot Richard three times, killing him. The deputies then seized Kristy’s cell phone and vehicle, took her to the back of a PCSO car, patted her down twice, handcuffed her, moved her to another PCSO vehicle, and drove her to a PCSO facility, where she was detained for hours. Richard’s estate and Kristy brought a civil rights action under 42 USC § 1983 against the deputies, the PCSO, and the Pueblo County Board of Commissioners. As relevant here, the complaint alleged Fourth Amendment claims against the deputies in their personal capacities for excessive force against Richard and unlawfully arresting Kristy and unlawfully seizing her property. When discovery closed, Kristy moved for partial summary judgment on her federal and state unlawful arrest claims. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims, with the deputies asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment, denying qualified immunity on all applicable claims.
The deputies filed an interlocutory appeal, and plaintiffs requested dismissal of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, asserting that the appeal is premised solely on the deputies’ version of the facts. The deputies argued that the district court used the wrong legal framework in adjudicating qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, confusing the analytical frameworks of qualified immunity and traditional summary judgment. They asserted jurisdiction to review this argument because it alleges only a legal error. However, this argument misunderstands applicable law. To overcome a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that (1) there is a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and (2) the right was clearly established when the defendant’s conduct occurred. Here, the district court construed the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. The district court made findings on both prongs of the inquiry; it placed the burden on plaintiffs to show a clearly established constitutional violation; and it found that plaintiffs showed that a reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation and that the conduct violated a clearly established right. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the qualified immunity inquiry at summary judgment.
The deputies also argued that the district court erroneously determined a reasonable jury could find they violated Richard’s and Kristy’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. They maintained that the record must be reviewed de novo and their version of the facts adopted because the district court’s version “is blatantly contradicted by the record.” As relevant here, summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute about an abstract legal issue relating to qualified immunity. This jurisdictional limitation generally precludes review of a district court’s factual conclusions. But, as relevant here, the factual record may be reviewed de novo in reviewing the denial of qualified immunity under the “blatant contradiction” exception to this rule, which applies when the record blatantly contradicts the version of events the district court holds a reasonable jury could find. A party asserting this exception must show that there is evidence that completely and indisputably contradicts the challenged factual finding. Here, nothing in the record blatantly contradicts the finding that two versions of events could be true, so the district court correctly determined there is a material factual dispute. The blatant-contradiction exception is thus inapplicable.
On the merits, as to the first prong of qualified immunity, the deputies contended that their efforts were reasonable under the case’s specific circumstances. But this argument contradicts the district court’s factual findings and is thus an unreviewable attack on the court’s determinations regarding the facts and inferences supported by the summary judgment record. So, to the extent the deputies argue there was no constitutional violation, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The deputies’ argument on the second prong similarly tries to disguise a factual dispute under the guise of an abstract legal issue, so to the extent the deputies argue that the law was not clearly established at the time of the conduct, the appeal must also be dismissed.
To the extent the appeal raises an abstract legal question, the denial of qualified immunity was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction in all other respects.