Estrada v. Smart.
No. 23-1189. 7/16/2024. D.Colo. Judge Federico. Prison Litigation Reform Act—Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—Colorado Department of Corrections Regulations—Summary Judgment.
July 16, 2024
Estrada was a prisoner in Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) custody. He was transported to a county courthouse for a hearing, and while in the jury box, he attempted to escape. His hands and ankles were shackled to his waist, so Estrada was only able to shuffle across the floor. During his shuffle across the courtroom, CDOC officer Smart, who was in the courtroom and in charge of guarding him, shot Estrada three times. Estrada sued Smart under 42 USC § 1983, alleging excessive force. Smart moved for summary judgment on the ground that Estrada failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court concluded that Estrada had failed to exhaust all available CDOC administrative remedies by not following CDOC’s three-step grievance process, and it granted the motion.
On appeal, Estrada argued that the district court usurped the jury’s role by resolving all disputed issues regarding administrative exhaustion at summary judgment and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing. However, under § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition to bringing suit on prison conditions, and unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court. Thus, in a prisoner case involving the failure to exhaust defense, a district court should resolve pretrial all disputed issues of law and fact that are not intertwined with the claim’s merits, and judges may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without jury participation. If the plaintiff establishes a disputed issue of material fact, an evidentiary hearing should normally be held, unless the district court decides to not conduct a hearing and explains why one is unnecessary. But if neither party requests an evidentiary hearing, a district court is not required to sua sponte raise the issue. Here, the district court correctly followed this procedure.
Estrada further contended that a county courthouse is not a CDOC prison, so the PLRA does not apply. Estrada did not make this argument before the district court, but the Tenth Circuit decided to consider it because the district court thoroughly analyzed the scope of the PLRA in its order granting summary judgment. Under PLRA § 3626(g)(2), a “civil action with respect to prison conditions” is defined broadly as “any civil proceeding . . . with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison[.]” Accordingly, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to a prisoner case regarding activity outside a prison.
Estrada also asserted that the CDOC grievance procedures apply only to CDOC prisons, so his claim is outside the scope of when and where they apply. CDOC Administrative Regulation 850-04 formalizes a three-step grievance procedure for inmates that covers a broad range of complaints, including incidents that occur outside a CDOC facility while the prisoner is in CDOC custody, “such as during transport to court appearances or medical visits.” Here, Estrada filed three grievances on unrelated topics in the year following the shooting, so he knew the procedure was available, but he did not file a grievance for the courthouse shooting. Accordingly, Smart met his burden of proof by establishing that Estrada failed to exhaust available CDOC administrative remedies. And when the summary judgment burden shifted to Estrada to show that the CDOC regulations did not apply or were not available, he failed to provide evidence.
The summary judgment was affirmed.
The full opinion is available at https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111079946.pdf.