Grand Junction Peace Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Grand Junction.
2024 COA 89. No. 23CA1704. Class Action Certification—Actions Against Public Employees—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Sovereign Immunity—Attorney Fees and Costs.
August 8, 2024
In 1998, the City of Grand Junction (city) instituted a Retiree Health Program (the program) to pay the health insurance premiums for certain retired city employees. At times relevant to this appeal, Hazelhurst was the city’s human resources director, Welch was the city’s finance director, and Caton was the city manager. Initially, the program was funded through biweekly, nonrefundable deductions from eligible employees’ paychecks. The deductions were mandatory for all city employees enrolled in the city’s health insurance plan. But concerns arose about the program’s ongoing financial viability, and over a multiyear period, the city changed the program’s funding structure, enrollment and eligibility requirements, and benefits. The Grand Junction Peace Officers’ Association a/k/a Grand Junction Police Officers’ FOP Lodge 68 (association), on behalf of its members and all others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against the city and Hazelhurst, Welch, and Caton (defendants), in their individual and official capacities. The association brought various claims alleging mismanagement of the program. In their answer, defendants asserted, among other defenses, that the association’s requested relief was barred and/or limited by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) because some claims were torts or could lie in tort. The association later moved for class certification. Defendants then moved to stay the litigation and for leave to conduct limited discovery to determine whether the association’s claims were barred under CRS § 24-10-108 (pertaining to actions against public entities) and CRS § 24-10-118(2.5) (pertaining to actions against public employees) of the CGIA. The court granted the stay motion and said it would reserve ruling on the certification motion until it had ruled on whether the association’s claims were barred under the CGIA. Ultimately, the court dismissed the association’s complaint under the CGIA and determined that defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.
On appeal, the association argued that the court erred by failing to certify this case as a class action before ruling on whether the CGIA barred the association’s claims. Under CRCP 23(c)(1), courts must determine whether a case may proceed as a class action as soon as practicable after commencement of a class action. Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by deferring adjudication of the class certification motion because sovereign immunity issues are jurisdictional, and the association did not show that class action certification would have helped the court determine whether it could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
The association also argued that the court erred by dismissing its breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims, and its claim against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty. However, these claims could lie in tort, and the breach of fiduciary duty claim fails because it is time barred. Therefore, the court did not err in dismissing these claims.
The association further contended that the court applied the incorrect legal standard in reviewing the association’s breach of fiduciary duty claim by requiring it to prove causation in the tort sense. As part of its CGIA analysis, the court was required to determine before trial whether the individual defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct, because a public employee is immune from liability in an injury claim that lies in tort or could lie in tort unless the act or omission causing the alleged injury was willful and wanton. But a court does not decide issues of negligence or causation at that stage because those issues are distinct from immunity. Here, the court applied the correct legal standard under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993). The court focused on whether the association had shown that the individual defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct; it did not analyze causation. Further, the court’s analysis of whether the individual defendants willfully and wantonly breached a fiduciary duty did not ultimately matter because the court correctly determined that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was time barred. Thus, the court did not apply an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the association’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
The association also asserted that the court reversibly erred by allowing defense witness Holman, a certified public accountant, to give expert testimony at the Trinity hearing because the city had not disclosed him as an expert. Even if the court erred in this regard, such error was harmless because the court did not rely solely on Holman’s testimony in adjudicating the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and the record does not indicate that the court relied on Holman’s testimony when deciding whether the association’s unjust enrichment claim against the city lies or could lie in tort. Similarly, the court did not rely on Holman’s testimony in dismissing the breach of contract claim before it conducted the Trinity hearing. Accordingly, the court’s admission of this testimony does not warrant reversal.
Lastly, the association contended that the court erred by deciding that defendants were entitled to an award of their attorney fees and costs because the court did not dismiss its accounting claim, so the court did not dismiss its entire case. An attorney fee award is proper under CRS § 13-17-201 only if the court dismisses all of the plaintiff’s claims. Here, the record is unclear whether the court intended to dismiss the association’s accounting claim, together with the association’s other claims. Further, the court did not determine the amount of attorney fees and costs to which defendants were entitled, so no attorney fee order is ripe for appellate review.
Defendants requested an award of their appellate attorney fees and costs, pursuant to CRS § 13-17-201.
The association’s challenge to the court’s award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants was dismissed, the judgment was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.