In re Marriage of Teruel De Torres.
2025 COA 96. No. 24CA0231. Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act—Modification of Custody or Decision-Making Responsibility—Civil Procedure—Declaratory Judgments—CRCP 57—First Amendment.
December 24, 2025
The parties’ marriage was dissolved in 2020. They have one child, whose full legal name is Javier Reece Teruel. During the dissolution proceedings, mother requested that the child’s name be changed to Reece Teruel Javernick. Over father’s objection, the court ordered the parents to call him “Reece” and required third parties to also call the child solely by that name. Father appealed the name portion of the permanent orders, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order the parents to call the child by a particular name. A court of appeals division vacated that aspect of the permanent orders and remanded for further proceedings. The parties then stipulated to joint decision-making authority without a tiebreaker and equal parenting time starting in May 2022. In March 2022, on remand, the court ordered the parties to use the full name of Javier Reece Teruel on official records but noted its limited authority to enter an order addressing what the parents could call the child in their respective homes. The court stated that the child could be called different names in each parent’s home. Neither parent appealed the March 2022 order, but in October 2022, father sought declaratory relief under CRCP 57 for clarification of the March 2022 order, arguing that an additional order was needed because he had evidence that the child was still being called Reece at school and at the pediatrician’s office. Father requested an order declaring that “the minor child shall be called Javier or Javi in the public eye.” Mother argued that the court lacked authority to enter such an order and challenged the March 2022 order on First Amendment grounds. Ultimately, in December 2023, the court ordered that the child be enrolled in all school programs and activities as Javier Reece Teruel and that school staff not be told he goes by “Reece” or any other name. The court also stated that mother could call the child by another name. The court did not address mother’s argument regarding the applicability of CRS § 14-10-129.
On appeal, mother argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify its prior order or grant relief under CRCP 57. CRS § 14-10-131(2) provides that a court must leave intact a prior order allocating decision-making responsibility unless the court finds one or more of the circumstances specified in § 14-10-131(2)(a) through (2)(c). The specific presumptions and standards for modifying decision-making orders in § 14-10-131(2) are substantive and thus matters a court should not consider under Rule 57. The court of appeals thus held that a district court may not rely on Rule 57 to adjudicate a parent’s request to modify a prior order concerning the allocation of decision-making responsibility. Here, the court failed to consider whether any of the § 14-10-131(2) circumstances applied under the appropriate standard of proof, so it erred by applying Rule 57 to modify the provision of the court’s March 2022 order addressing the name dispute.
Mother also argued that the December 2023 order violates her freedom of speech and freedom to parent under the US Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments because it restricts what she can call the child and compels what she may say to third parties in public about his name. The court declined to address the Fourteenth Amendment argument but determined that a court’s restriction of either parent’s speech about the child’s name is a content-based restriction that must meet heightened constitutional standards. Accordingly, to the extent that a court order limits what a parent may call a child in public or what the parent may or may not say to third parties about a child’s name, the court must narrowly tailor such restriction by considering, for example, whether the parent’s speech will be uttered in front of the child and will substantially harm the child, or whether the restrictions are so vague as to subject the parent bound by the restrictions to contempt without notice.
The December 2023 order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.