Jacobs v. Salt Lake City School District.
No. 23-4058. 10/9/2025. D.Utah. Judge Ebel. Educational Services for Children With Intellectual Disabilities—Individuals With Disabilities in Education Act—Americans With Disabilities Act—Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act—Standing—Plausible Claim for Relief.
October 9, 2025
In 2019, the Salt Lake City School District (district) created a “hub” system to consolidate educational services for certain children with intellectual disabilities and/or cognitive impairments. The hub’s purpose is to promote efficiency in service delivery and transportation by placing these students in a few designated district elementary schools. The district places intellectually disabled students into either a “mild/moderate” or “severe” category based solely on their IQs and does not consider individual students’ needs in assigning them to a designated school. E.J. and H.S. are intellectually disabled district students who are eligible to receive special education and related services. Under the hub system, the district assigned E.J. to a school with a special education class for students with mild/moderate intellectual disabilities. The district assigned H.S. to a special class for students with severe disabilities solely based on its decision that this was the only option available to students categorized as severe under the hub plan. When H.S.’s parents objected to that placement, the district terminated the special education services to H.S. E.J.’s and H.S.’s parents filed separate actions for administrative review of the hub placements asserting violations of the Individuals With Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) on behalf of their children as well as similarly situated students. In both cases, a hearing officer dismissed the ADA and IDEA claims to the extent they were asserted on behalf of other students. The hearing officer in E.J.’s case ruled against E.J., finding that the district had made an appropriate individualized educational placement determination. The hearing officer in H.S.’s case denied H.S. an administrative hearing on his individual IDEA claim because his “parents had not properly consented to special education services.” E.J., H.S., and the Disability Law Center (DLC) (collectively, plaintiffs) then filed suit in district court alleging that the district’s failure to make an individualized placement determination for each intellectually disabled student violates the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA). They sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated students. The district court construed plaintiffs’ claims to be seeking only placement in their neighborhood schools, relief that the Tenth Circuit previously determined is unavailable under those statutes. The district court then dismissed the IDEA and ADA causes of action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and dismissed the RA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as the IDEA requires.
As a threshold matter on appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that the individual plaintiffs have Article III standing because each (1) sufficiently alleged an actual injury fairly traceable to the hub system and (2) further alleged that these injuries are likely to be redressed if they succeed in obtaining an injunction requiring the district to make individualized determinations as to the most appropriate educational placement for them.
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that in implementing its hub system, the district circumvented the IDEA and ADA by automatically placing students in special classes for mild/moderate or severe intellectual disabilities based solely on a student’s IQ. The IDEA generally requires individualized educational decisions for each disabled student and requires states to educate disabled children in the least restrictive environment in which they can receive an appropriate education. The ADA prohibits excluding persons with disabilities from the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity. Here, plaintiffs alleged that the district categorically assigns intellectually disabled students to special education classrooms without making individualized determinations for each student as to whether that is the most appropriate educational placement. Thus, the district court wrongly interpreted plaintiffs’ claims as limited to seeking only to receive special education services in their neighborhood schools. Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently state plausible claims for relief under the IDEA and the ADA to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
In addition to their IDEA claim asserted on behalf of themselves and similarly situated students, E.J. and H.S. also asserted IDEA claims challenging the hearing officers’ decisions in each of their individual administrative IDEA proceedings and asserted that the district court erred in dismissing this case without addressing their individual IDEA claims. However, plaintiffs failed to allege claims specifically challenging the hearing officers’ decisions in E.J.’s and H.S.’s individual administrative proceedings.
Plaintiffs also contended that the way in which the district implements its hub system violates the ADA and the RA. The IDEA requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies under that statute before pursuing claims in court under other statutes, including the ADA and the RA, when those claims seek relief that the IDEA provides. Here, while E.J. and H.S. asserted an ADA claim in their individual IDEA administrative proceedings, neither asserted an RA claim, so the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ RA claim without prejudice for failing to exhaust their IDEA administrative remedies. But it would have been futile for E.J. and H.S. to try to exhaust their administrative remedies by asserting the RA claim in their IDEA administrative proceedings because it is clear that the hearing officers would have dismissed those RA claims for lack of jurisdiction as they did the ADA claims. Having concluded that plaintiffs adequately stated a claim under the ADA, and because the legal standards under the ADA and the RA are similar, the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs also stated a plausible claim for relief under the RA.
The decision was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.