Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc.
No. 24-4032. 7/21/2025. D.Utah. Judge Moritz. Americans With Disabilities Act—Rehabilitation Act—Discrimination—Retaliation—Pretext—Summary Judgment.
July 21, 2025
Jenny was a longtime employee of L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (L3Harris) and its predecessors, and his job required frequent international travel. He had recurring cellulitis that was aggravated by this travel, so he requested and was granted an accommodation that allowed him to book seats in exit-row, business-class, or first-class seating on long flights. Over the next three months, Jenny’s former supervisor, Vice President Kane, repeatedly made disparaging remarks about Jenny’s disability and accommodation requests, including in front of Jenny’s current supervisor, Vice President Gentile, who did not disapprove of Kane’s remarks. And less than three months after the accommodation’s approval, Jenny was denied permission to travel for routine business, re-organized out of his leadership role, and later discharged, based on his alleged request for a severance package. He sued L3Harris for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. L3Harris moved for summary judgment. The district court recognized that Jenny met his burden under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation and producing sufficient evidence that L3Harris’s explanation for his discharge was pretextual. But the court then cited the exception set out in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and concluded that Jenny’s evidence did not sufficiently link his discharge to any discriminatory or retaliatory motive. The court granted L3Harris summary judgment.
On appeal, Jenny argued that the district court improperly applied Reeves to grant summary judgment to L3Harris. The Reeves exception is narrow, and it applies where (1) conclusive evidence exists of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s action, or (2) the plaintiff offered a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was uncontroverted, independent evidence that no discrimination occurred. Reeves primarily clarified that a plaintiff who shows pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework generally does not need to do anything further to avoid summary judgment. Here, the district court speculated that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for L3Harris’s decision to fire Jenny, but the record would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the decisions to discharge Jenny, to deny Jenny’s travel requests, and to remove him from his leadership role were motivated by animus. Therefore, this case does not fall under the first Reeves scenario. Further, there is abundant evidence of pretext for L3Harris’s decisions. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the Reeves exception, and Jenny’s claims must go to a jury.
The summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.