Jiang v. City of Tulsa.
No. 25-5097. 3/17/2026. N.D.Okla. Judge Phillips. Hiring Practices—Age Discrimination—Race Discrimination—Retaliation—Pretext.
March 17, 2026
Jiang was a senior engineer at the A.B. Jewell water treatment plant (the plant) in the City of Tulsa (the city). Jiang, who was born in China, has a PhD in engineering and excelled in his job, but outside contractors sometimes complained that he was difficult to work with. In 2021, Jiang applied to be the plant’s superintendent. At that time, he had worked for Tulsa’s water department for over a decade and had applied unsuccessfully for a number of managerial positions. The city followed its two-step hiring procedure: the city’s personnel director first certified Jiang, Hutchcraft, and Curry as qualified candidates, and the personnel director gave that list of candidates to Hunter, the hiring manager for the position. Hunter convened a panel of herself and two other senior water department employees to interview and evaluate the candidates. Hunter concluded that Hutchcraft had the best combination of technical knowledge and leadership experience, so she hired him. When Jiang found out that Hutchcraft, a younger white male, was hired, he complained of race and age discrimination to the city’s human resources (HR) department. The HR department denied Jiang’s grievance, and Jiang appealed to the city’s civil service commission (the commission). The commission concluded that the personnel director should not have certified Hutchcraft or Curry because neither had a BA degree, as required in the position description, and the city’s written policy prohibited substituting experience for education. The commission told the city to “go back and follow” its policies. In response, the city removed the superintendent position’s degree requirement to reflect the city’s customary practice of substituting experience for education. The city then restarted the hiring process, the same three people applied, and the city again hired Hutchcraft, based on his leadership experience. Jiang filed another grievance with the HR department, which was denied, and Jiang again appealed to the commission, which denied the grievance because the city had followed its policies.
Jiang sued the city for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and for race and age discrimination under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act. He argued that the city’s statement that it wanted a candidate with more leadership experience was pretext for the city’s discriminatory animus and that the city removed the degree requirement to retaliate for his reporting discrimination. Jiang also brought retaliation claims under these statutes. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.
On appeal, Jiang argued that there is evidence of pretext in the record, so a jury should hear his disparate treatment and retaliation claims. Jiang asserted two procedural irregularities, that the HR department improperly certified Hutchcraft and Curry because neither qualified for the job under the city’s written policies; and after being told that Hutchcraft and Curry didn’t qualify, the city rewrote the job’s requirements to qualify them. The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973), burden-shifting framework to his ADEA and Title VII claims, under which (1) the employee must make a prima facie case of discrimination, or the employer wins; (2) the employer then offers a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, or the employee wins; and (3) the employee must then show facts that would permit a jury to find the employer’s legitimate reasons pretextual, or the employer wins. The city conceded that Jiang made a prima facie case of discrimination, so the case turned on pretext. At the summary judgment stage, an employer’s justification is pretextual if a reasonable jury could find it unbelievable. When deciding pretext, courts consider the facts from the decision-maker’s viewpoint, assessing whether the decision-maker honestly believed their nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring someone else, not whether the hiring decision was fair or correct. Here, Jiang didn’t contradict the city’s evidence that (1) it routinely substituted experience for education, even for jobs requiring a specific degree; and (2) the personnel director had previously certified a treatment plant superintendent who hadn’t met the degree requirement. Second, relaxing job requirements and reposting a position does not by itself let a jury find pretext. While removing the degree requirement may have been improper and inappropriate, it doesn’t undermine the city’s explanation for wanting a candidate with both technical knowledge and leadership experience. And there was unrebutted testimony that other managers supervised employees with higher technical qualifications. The procedural irregularities thus didn’t establish that the city’s explanation was pretextual.
Jiang also contended that the city’s interview process was so subjective that it shows pretext. But subjective evaluations don’t support pretext where, as here, evaluators explain their impressions and grade all candidates using the same criteria. Further, pretext is not shown by reviewers attaching different weight to different criteria. The subjectivity argument thus failed.
Jiang further asserted that pretext is shown because his qualifications were stronger than Hutchcraft’s. A jury can find pretext based on overqualification only where an overwhelming qualifications disparity exists. Here, though Jiang had better technical knowledge than Hutchcraft, the city believed Hutchcraft’s technical knowledge was sufficient. And Hutchcraft had leadership experience that Jiang lacked, and Hunter wanted someone with both. Accordingly, a jury couldn’t find pretext through overqualification.
Jiang additionally maintained that his disparate treatment arguments cumulatively allow a jury to find pretext. But the evidence supporting Jiang’s three theories wouldn’t let a jury find that the city’s reason for choosing Hutchcraft was pretextual.
Jiang also argued that the city retaliated against him by tailoring the supervisor job description’s revised education requirement “to the two white and younger applicants.” However, even assuming that Jiang made a prima facie case, he didn’t show pretext because, as explained above, Jiang never contradicted the city’s legitimate explanation that it changed the education requirement to reflect its previous hiring practice.
The summary judgment was affirmed.