Mauldin v. Driscoll.
No. 24-7010. 5/6/2025. E.D.Okla. Judge Federico. Employment—Age Discrimination in Employment Act—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act—Retaliation—Interested Witness Evidence—Summary Judgment—Pretext.
May 6, 2025
In 1991, the Army hired Mauldin, a female born in 1958. In 2003, Mauldin became an explosives operator supervisor at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP). Buckner, a male born in 1971, was Mauldin’s second-level supervisor. In 2015, two employees that Mauldin supervised were accused of sexual harassment, and one was ultimately fired. MCAAP’s commanding officer signed a letter of reprimand and directed Buckner to issue it to Mauldin, but after discussing the matter with Mauldin, Buckner did not issue the reprimand. Mauldin filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) grievance regarding the sexual harassment accusations, asserting that both of her employees should have been fired and that she disagreed with the result. In 2016, Mauldin successfully challenged, through MCAAP’s EEO office, a poor performance rating that she received. Later that year, Mauldin submitted a statement supporting her coworker Cloud’s EEO age discrimination complaint, alleging that Buckner had made age-inappropriate statements. Cloud is a male born in 1951. Mauldin alleged that in 2017 she and Buckner discussed Cloud’s EEO complaint and her statement, and she claimed that she was not treated the same by Buckner after these incidents. In 2018, Mauldin was one of six applicants for a promotional position. All six applicants were in similar positions and had similar backgrounds. Five applicants accepted an interview from Buckner, including Mauldin. Though he was not required to do so, Buckner convened a three-person interview panel to score the applicants. After conducting interviews, each panelist independently scored Mauldin the lowest and Harkey, a male born in 1981, the highest. Buckner selected Harkey for the promotion. Mauldin then filed an EEO complaint alleging age and sex discrimination, and retaliation against her because of her EEO activity. She subsequently filed a formal complaint and requested an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearing but withdrew her complaint before a decision was issued. Mauldin sued the secretary of the US Department of the Army, asserting claims of retaliation and discrimination based on age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the Army summary judgment.
On appeal, Mauldin argued that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard and thus erred by considering the Army’s evidence and granting it summary judgment on her retaliation and discrimination claims. Specifically, she challenged the district court’s consideration of Buckner’s deposition and declaration and the interview panelists’ declarations, maintaining that because this evidence came from interested witnesses, the district court erred in considering it when granting the Army summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit initially held for the first time that a district court may consider interested witness evidence from the movant at the summary judgment stage if a jury would be required to believe such evidence because it is uncontradicted and unimpeached.
Because Mauldin lacked direct evidence, the Tenth Circuit analyzed her retaliation and discrimination claims under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Mauldin must establish a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. Then, the burden shifts to the Army to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the Army meets this burden, Mauldin must then show that the Army’s stated reason was pretextual. On the ADEA claim, to show a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was involved in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee would have considered the challenged employment action materially adverse, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Here, Mauldin engaged in a protected activity by submitting a statement in support of Cloud’s EEO complaint and suffered a materially adverse action by not being selected for the promotion. But it is undisputed that the Army proffered evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Mauldin, as it offered evidence that the interview panel recommended Harkey for the promotion based on the quality of his interview performance. And the record evidence shows that the hiring process was neutral and lacked retaliatory motive. Accordingly, Mauldin failed to show a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. The district court thus did not err in granting the Army summary judgment on Mauldin’s ADEA retaliation claim.
Mauldin also argued that the district court erred in granting the Army summary judgment on her ADEA and Title VII age and sex discrimination claims. Again assessing these claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Tenth Circuit determined that Mauldin made a prima facie showing of discrimination because she is a member of protected classes (age and sex), she suffered an adverse employment action, she is qualified for the position at issue, and the challenged action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. But the Army proffered evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Mauldin. Further, Mauldin was selected for an interview before an interview panel that consisted primarily of women and individuals over 40 years of age. The interview panel’s scoring matrix consisted mostly of objective criteria, and the interview panel unanimously selected and recommended Harkey for legitimate reasons. Buckner then followed the panel’s recommendation in his hiring decision, despite not being required to do so. Therefore, nothing about the interview questions, panel composition, or hiring process is sufficient to establish pretext.
The summary judgment was affirmed.