McBride v. Northeastern Junior College.
2026 COA 77. No. 24CA1591. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Immunity and Partial Waiver—Dangerous Condition of a Public Highway, Road, or Street—Sidewalk—Public Roadway.
October 29, 2026
McBride attended a public event on the campus of Northeastern Junior College (Northeastern). When leaving the event, he walked on a pathway, caught his right foot on the edge of a concrete slab that had sunk approximately two and a half inches below the rest of the path, and fell, sustaining injuries. McBride sued Northeastern and the Colorado Community College System (collectively, defendants) under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), seeking over $100,000 in damages. Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting governmental immunity. The district court determined that defendants waived immunity, reasoning that CRS § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) authorizes a waiver of immunity for a “dangerous condition” on “any public . . . sidewalk,” and that the pathway where McBride fell qualifies as a “sidewalk” with a dangerous condition due to a misaligned slab. The court denied the motion on this sole ground.
On appeal, defendants argued that the district court erred because it relied on a “common sense” definition of a “sidewalk” instead of the CGIA’s statutory definition. The CGIA defines a sidewalk as “that portion of a public roadway between the curb lines or the lateral lines of the traveled portion and the adjacent property lines which is constructed, designed, maintained, and intended for the use of pedestrians.” § 24-10-103(6). It is undisputed that the pathway in question meets the second part of the statutory definition. As to the first part of the definition, the pathway only qualifies as a sidewalk under the CGIA if one side of it is also a “portion of a public roadway.” The court of appeals determined that the CGIA is ambiguous as to what constitutes a “public roadway” and when a pedestrian pathway is a “portion of” that public roadway. The court concluded that the pedestrian pathway where McBride fell is not a “sidewalk” under the CGIA because (1) the General Assembly did not intend for a parking lot to be a “public roadway” and (2) the pedestrian pathway is not close in proximity to the campus road or highway for the pedestrian pathway to be a portion of those roadways. Accordingly, the district court erred by determining that defendants waived sovereign immunity under § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) and denying their motion to dismiss.
The order was reversed and the case was remanded to determine whether defendants waived sovereign immunity under the other CGIA provisions relied on by McBride.