Mukantagara v. Noem.
No. 24-4071. 1/12/2026. D.Utah. Judge Phillips. US Citizenship and Immigration Services—Termination of Refugee Status—Eligibility Determination—Discretionary Actions—Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
January 12, 2026
US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) admitted Mukantagara as a refugee and her son Shyaka as her minor dependent in 2005. Two years later, USCIS paused Mukantagara’s refugee status and revoked her travel documents. In 2016, USCIS decided that Mukantagara had participated in the Rwandan genocide. It terminated her refugee status under 8 USC § 1157(c)(4), which allows USCIS to terminate a person’s refugee status if it finds that the person did not meet the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) definition of “refugee” when admitted into the United States. Because USCIS found that Mukantagara had participated in the genocide, she fell under the 8 USC § 1101(a)(42) “persecutor bar” and thus did not qualify as a refugee. The government then placed Mukantagara and her son into removal proceedings. Mukantagara denied that she participated in the genocide, and in removal proceedings, the immigration court found Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum application. But the immigration court denied asylum to Shyaka, ruling that he neither independently qualified for asylum nor qualified as Mukantagara’s dependent, since by the time Mukantagara applied for asylum in removal proceedings, Shyaka had aged out of eligibility. The parties appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the immigration court’s decision granting asylum to Mukantagara and affirmed the decision denying asylum to Shyaka. On remand, the immigration court granted Mukantagara asylum again. Shyaka petitioned for review before the Tenth Circuit. Meanwhile, Mukantagara and Shyaka sued USCIS under the Administrative Procedure Act for terminating Mukantagara’s refugee status. The district court held that 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applied to 8 USC § 1157(c)(4), the INA provision for terminating refugee status, and dismissed their suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The BIA abated the government’s appeal of the immigration court’s second grant of asylum to Mukantagara, and the Tenth Circuit abated Shyaka’s petition for review, pending the outcome in this case.
On appeal, Mukantagara and Shyaka challenged the dismissal of their lawsuit. Termination of refugee status under § 1157(c)(4) has two steps. The first is an eligibility determination on whether the noncitizen met the INA’s definition of “refugee” when admitted into the country. At the second step, the agency exercises its discretion to choose whether to terminate the eligible noncitizen’s status. As relevant here, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars courts from reviewing immigration agencies’ discretionary actions. Based on persuasive precedent interpreting similar INA provisions that govern Temporary Protected Status and adjustment of status for refugees, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies only to discretionary actions and that the eligibility determination under § 1157(c)(4)’s step one is not discretionary. Because the first step is nondiscretionary, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply. Therefore, Mukantagara and her son can sue USCIS over its nondiscretionary eligibility determination under § 1157(c)(4).
The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.