Murillo v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
2026 COA 70. No. 25CA2335. Workers’ Compensation—Notices and Procedures—Reopening of Claim—Change in Condition.
September 17, 2026
Murillo worked as a housekeeper for the Ritz-Carlton Bachelor Gulch. She filed a timely claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on an alleged back injury. Her employer and its insurer (jointly, the employer) filed a notice of contest denying liability for the claim. Six months later, the employer petitioned to close the claim based on failure to prosecute, contending that Murillo had taken no action since filing her claim. The director of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (director) ordered Murillo to show cause within 30 days why her claim should not be closed. Murillo failed to respond to the show cause order, and the claim was closed. Several months later, Murillo petitioned to reopen her claim and applied for a hearing on compensability, medical benefits, and temporary disability benefits. She asserted that her claim should be reopened because her condition had worsened since her claim was closed. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered a bifurcated hearing, with the petition to reopen to be addressed first. The ALJ granted Murillo’s petition to reopen her claim, stating that CRS § 8-43-207(1)(n)—the failure to prosecute provision—did not apply to Murillo’s case and that her claim should not have been closed. The ALJ then determined that Murillo met her burden under § 8-43-303(1) of proving that her condition had worsened and subsequently awarded her benefits related to the medical treatment she had received. The employer appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (panel) both the order granting Murillo’s petition to reopen and the order awarding her benefits. The panel (1) concluded that § 8-43-207(1)(n) applies to all cases, not just those where the employer admitted benefits; and (2) determined that a claim closed without an order on compensability cannot be reopened based on a “worsened condition” under § 8-43-303(1). The panel concluded that Murillo was limited to reopening her claim by showing that closure of the compensability issue resulted from error or mistake. The panel thus found that the ALJ erred by reopening Murillo’s claim based on a change in condition.
On appeal, Murillo argued that the panel misconstrued § 8-43-303(1) because the statute does not require a determination of compensable injury before the claim was closed. The court of appeals held that a claim may be reopened based on a changed condition only if, before the claim was closed, there was an admission or a determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. Accordingly, the panel properly determined that Murillo could not reopen her claim based on a change in condition because, before the closure, there was no admission or determination that she sustained a compensable injury. Further, Murillo was not foreclosed from pursuing another avenue for reopening a claim under § 8-43-303(1), for instance, by showing that her claim was closed due to fraud, error, or mistake. But Murillo did not show fraud, error, or mistake. The panel thus did not err by holding that Murillo could not reopen her claim based on a change in condition.
Murillo also challenged the panel’s statement that § 8-43-207(1)(n) “provides that compensability . . . may be required to be adjudicated within an approximately six-month period following the dispute of the issue.” She maintained that this creates a new and shorter statute of limitations than the two-year period in § 8-43-103. However, applying both statutes as written does not shorten or otherwise alter the two-year statute of limitations, because § 8-43-103 only requires a claim to be filed within two years of the injury, while § 8-43-207(1)(n) and WCRP 7-1(C) require the claimant to actively prosecute the claim once it has been filed. Here, Murillo did nothing to advance her claim for at least six months and failed to respond to the director’s show cause order, so the director properly closed her claim.
Murillo further contended that the panel mischaracterized the ALJ’s ruling as saying a claim cannot be closed for failure to prosecute under § 8-43-207(1)(n) if “benefits have not been admitted.” Even if there was a mischaracterization, it did not affect the panel’s decision, which was based on its interpretation of “a change in condition” under § 8-43-303(1), not on the ALJ’s interpretation of § 20-8-43-207(1)(n). So any alleged mischaracterization was immaterial.
Murillo also asserted that the panel conflated the standard for closing a claim for failure to prosecute with the burden required to reopen a closed claim. But even if the panel conflated the standards, it did not affect the outcome because Murillo didn’t seek to reopen her claim on the basis of “mistake or error.”
Murillo further maintained that the panel misread the reopening statute to require that a claim closed for failure to prosecute can be reopened only for “mistake or error.” But as discussed above, Murillo could not establish a change in condition without an original finding of a compensable injury, and she did not seek reopening on any other statutory ground. Her petition thus could not be granted as a matter of law.
Lastly, Murillo argued that the panel’s decision contravenes the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) by concluding that § 8-43-207(1)(n) “places a premium upon the need for timely activity” in resolving compensability. Here, the panel’s use of “premium” was not critical to its application of the reopening statute or its ultimate conclusion. And to the extent the panel intended to emphasize the importance of timely prosecution, there was no conflict between that view and the Act’s purpose.
The order was affirmed.