New Mexico Trappers Ass’n. v. Torrez.
No. 25-2117. 6/8/2026. D.N.M. Judge Kelly. Trapping Ban—Establishment Clause—Equal Protection Clause—New Mexico Civil Rights Act—Standing—Ripeness—Redressability—Severability Clause—Supplemental Jurisdiction.
June 8, 2026
New Mexico enacted the New Mexico Wildlife Conservation and Public Safety Act (the Act), which prohibits using traps, snares, or wildlife poison to capture, injure, or kill an animal on public land. The Act has exceptions for enrolled members of federally recognized Indian tribes who trap for religious purposes pursuant to rules issued by the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (the exception). New Mexico has not promulgated rules pursuant to the exception. The New Mexico Trappers Association, the National Trappers Association, and the Fur Takers of America, Inc. (collectively, the Trappers) are nonprofit trappers’ rights organizations. They sued the New Mexico Attorney General, the vice chair of the New Mexico State Game Commission, and the director of the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, alleging that the exception violates the US Constitution’s Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, the New Mexico Constitution’s Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, and the New Mexico Civil Rights Act, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Trappers did not challenge the Act’s general prohibition against trapping in their complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of standing. In response, the Trappers stated explicitly that they showed “economic, recreational, aesthetic, psychological, and stigmatic injuries.” The district court held that the Trappers’ alleged economic, recreational, aesthetic, and psychological injuries are not redressable because even if the exception were struck, the Act would still prohibit the Trappers from trapping. And while their stigmatic injury is redressable, the harm alleged does not rise to a judicially cognizable level, and otherwise this injury is not ripe for review. The court dismissed the federal and state constitutional claims without prejudice for lack of standing and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state statutory claim.
On appeal, the Trappers argued that the exception cannot be severed from the Act, so if the exception is unlawful, the entire Act is unlawful, and their claims are redressable. They appeared to contend that without a severability clause, there is a presumption that the legislature would not have enacted the statute without the exception. A severability clause raises a presumption of severability, but the Trappers cited no authority suggesting that a reverse presumption—that the lack of severability clause raises a presumption that an act is not severable—should exist. And case law suggests that courts should generally sever the unconstitutional portion of a statute if possible. Here, the circumstances do not suggest that the New Mexico legislature would have refused to pass the Act without the exception. Accordingly, even if the exception is unlawful, it could be severed from the Act, leaving the trapping prohibition in place. The Trappers’ economic, recreational, aesthetic, and psychological injuries based on their inability to trap are thus not redressable, and they failed to establish standing.
The Trappers also argued that their psychological and stigmatic injuries are ripe even without any regulations. They maintained that the exception communicates that the government favors Native Americans over other groups, and because the Trappers are excluded from the favored group, they have suffered psychological and stigmatic injury. A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it depends on contingent future events that may or may not occur. The exception applies only pursuant to department of game and fish rules, which have not been and may not ever be promulgated. Thus, the prohibition against trapping currently stands, regardless of Native American status, and the claim is not ripe. Further, even if the claim were ripe, the Trappers’ theory that the exception communicates that they are not in the preferred group is abstract rather than concrete, and it is not particularized because anyone could similarly claim that the exception communicates a preference for Native Americans. Accordingly, the Trappers have presented a generalized grievance that does not confer standing.
The Trappers further asserted that they have standing to bring the state constitutional claims for the reasons discussed above, but they did not challenge the district court’s discretion. Having rejected the standing arguments, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the district court erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The dismissal without prejudice was affirmed.