People in Interest of C.N.T.

2026 COA 47. No. 25CA1563. Juvenile Court—Dependency and Neglect—Termination of the Parent-Child Legal Relationship—Guardian ad Litem—Standing.

June 4, 2026

The Chaffee County Department of Human Services (department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect against father and mother (the parents) regarding their child C.N.T. The parents admitted that C.N.T. was in an injurious environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated C.N.T. dependent and neglected. After a dispositional hearing, the court adopted treatment plans for the parents that required them to address substance use and domestic violence, improve their parenting skills, attend family time, and provide a safe and stable home. The guardian ad litem (GAL) subsequently moved to terminate the parents’ parental rights, and the department didn’t object to the motion. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing in which the GAL and the department participated. It granted the GAL’s motion and terminated the parents’ parent-child legal relationships with C.N.T.

On appeal, the parents argued that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate their parental rights because the GAL didn’t have standing to move for termination under People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, ¶ 33, which held that the State is the exclusive party to prosecute a dependency or neglect proceeding. The court of appeals concluded that R.M.P. doesn’t apply here because (1) that case applies to only the adjudicatory phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding, and the motion to terminate was filed in the dispositional phase of the proceeding; and (2) the GAL was acting under CRS § 19-3 203(5), which charges a GAL to represent the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the GAL had standing to file the motion to terminate.

Father maintained that his treatment plan was inappropriate and that he substantially complied with it, so the juvenile court therefore erred by terminating his parental rights. However, the record supports the court’s finding that father’s treatment plan adequately addressed the safety concerns that initiated the department’s involvement, so it was appropriate. The record also supports the juvenile court’s findings that father didn’t reasonably comply with the treatment plan and that the treatment plan was unsuccessful, and the court’s determination that father showed the same problems addressed in the treatment plan without sufficient improvement.

The parents further contended that the juvenile court erred by finding that the department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and reunite the family. However, the record supports the court’s determination that the department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with C.N.T. but that the parents didn’t use the resources provided to become fit.

The parents additionally asserted that the juvenile court erred in its fitness findings. Father maintained that the court erred by finding that he was unfit, while mother argued that the court erred by finding that she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. The juvenile court found that father was unfit based largely on the same evidence it relied on to determine that he failed to successfully comply with his treatment plan. As set forth above, the record supports those findings. As to mother, the court determined that she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time because, though she had recently made progress, her engagement came too late, especially considering that this case was an expedited permanency planning case. The record supports the court’s finding.

Father also contended that the juvenile court erred by finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination because the department failed to make ongoing efforts to identify placement options with relatives. But the record shows that the department conducted a diligent search for relatives but couldn’t identify any other options, and father failed to identify any relatives who were suitable for placement.

Father further asserted that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. But his allegations do not create a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The judgment was affirmed.