People in Interest of E.D.
2025 COA 11. No. 24CA0119. Dependency and Neglect—Termination of the Parent-Child Legal Relationship—Family Time Services—Family Time Upon Removal.
January 30, 2025
The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families (the division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect against mother after multiple reports of concerns including mother’s mental health and arrest, which allegedly left no appropriate caregiver for then-9-year-old E.D. Following a contested shelter hearing, the juvenile court granted temporary custody of E.D. to the division and ordered mother to participate in therapeutic family time. Following another contested hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated E.D. dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. More than two years later, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights following a contested hearing.
On appeal, mother argued that the juvenile court erred by finding that the division made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because the division did not provide appropriate family time services as required by the Children’s Code. Mother asserted that the court erred by (1) violating CRS § 19-3-217 by restricting her family time without first conducting a hearing; (2) authorizing a suspension or deprivation of family time; (3) improperly delegating to others its authority to restrict family time; (4) failing to expand mother’s family time beyond the therapeutic setting; and (5) failing to ensure the division provided E.D. with appropriate therapeutic services necessary to support face-to-face family time. To satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, a human services department must make available and provide to parents family time services for children in out-of-home placements. First, the § 19-3-217(3) conditions triggering a hearing—specifically, “an ongoing reduction in, suspension of, or increase in the level of supervision” of family time—were never met here. Rather, the court was required to, and consistently provided, oversight of the ongoing restrictions. Second, there was no deprivation or suspension of family time because the record supports the court’s findings that the division provided timely referrals for therapeutic family time, and the juvenile court properly assumed intensive judicial supervision over therapeutic family time services. When, as here, a juvenile court appropriately restricts parenting time to a therapeutic setting, a human services department can satisfy its reasonable efforts obligation by making available and providing appropriate therapeutic services, even if those services don’t successfully result in face-to-face contact because of continuing risks to the child’s health and safety from such contact. Third, contrary to mother’s argument, the court, not the division, restricted family time, so the court didn’t improperly delegate the authority to restrict or suspend family time. Fourth, the record supports the limitation on mother’s family time to a therapeutic setting as necessary for E.D.’s safety and mental, emotional, and physical health, and this limitation remained necessary continued throughout this case. Fifth, the record supports the court’s finding that the division provided E.D. appropriate services to address the trauma he had experienced while in mother’s care.
Mother also argued that the division did not make reasonable efforts because it didn’t timely refer her for a psychological evaluation. While mother didn’t raise this argument before the juvenile court, and there are no specific findings about her psychological evaluation, the court found with record support that the division made reasonable efforts because it modified services to fit the family’s needs. And any delay was reasonable, because the division did not want to duplicate a service that mother’s therapeutic provider insisted had been completed.
Mother further contended that the division’s delay in making the referral for the psychological evaluation resulted in a delay in providing appropriate accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Here, as discussed above, the delay was reasonable because all parties believed that mother had already completed a psychological evaluation. Thus, the division provided the accommodations mother requested as it became aware of mother’s needs under the ADA.
Mother additionally asserted that her counsel was ineffective because he did not challenge the division’s alleged failure to facilitate family time. However, the record shows that mother’s trial counsel repeatedly raised reasonable efforts throughout the pendency of the case, so she failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
Mother also argued that her trial counsel was ineffective concerning the management of her disabilities because counsel did not ensure that she received a formal psychological evaluation until more than a year after her treatment plan was adopted. But mother provided no authority requiring a parent’s counsel to ensure that a parent participates in services; and the therapeutic provider, not counsel, led the parties to mistakenly believe that mother had completed a psychological evaluation.
Mother further maintained that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not timely issuing subpoenas or retaining expert witnesses. Here, there is no indication that mother’s expert would have been able to provide the suggested testimony regardless of when she was retained.
Lastly, mother contended that her counsel made inadequate expert disclosures that precluded her expert from testifying about the specialized training needed to conduct specialized trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy, maintaining that the therapists the division furnished were not qualified to give E.D. the therapy he needed. Assuming without deciding that counsel’s late disclosure of the expert witness was below the range of professionally competent assistance, mother failed to demonstrate prejudice, so this argument failed.
The judgment was affirmed.