People in Interest of M.M.F.
2026 COA 21. No. 25CA1468. Dependency and Neglect—Deferred Adjudication—Dismissal Order—Standing—Non-State Parties in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings—Final Appealable Order.
March 26, 2026
Denver Human Services (the department) received a referral from the juvenile court to investigate the truancy case of M.M.F. The department filed a petition in dependency and neglect alleging, as relevant here, that M.M.F.’s mother had left a fentanyl dependence treatment facility and that the parents couldn’t adequately address the youth’s mental health issues. The parents made no-fault admissions to the petition and agreed to deferred adjudications under CRS § 19-3-505(5). The department later told the juvenile court that it wanted to dismiss the petition and close the case because it had no ongoing safety concerns. M.M.F. was represented by a counsel for youth (CFY) who objected to dismissal due to the parents’ failure to adequately address M.M.F.’s mental health needs. The case was kept open pending a decision in People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, where the court held, among other things, that a child, through a CFY, lacks standing to continue pursuing a dependency and neglect petition after the State decides to dismiss it. At the next hearing in M.M.F.’s case after R.M.P., the department again informed the juvenile court of its desire to dismiss the petition, and the parents argued that R.M.P. required dismissal. The CFY objected to dismissal, asserting that M.M.F.’s case was distinguishable from R.M.P. because the court here had already made a finding that M.M.F. was dependent and neglected. The CFY thus maintained that M.M.F. had standing to file a motion to revoke the deferred adjudication. The juvenile court read R.M.P. to hold that the department has authority to dismiss a petition outright before an adjudication. And because an adjudication hadn’t yet been entered, the court determined that the CFY lacked standing to object to the dismissal. The court granted the department’s request to dismiss the case.
M.M.F. appealed, and the court of appeals ordered him to show cause why the appeal shouldn’t be dismissed based on the lack of a final, appealable order. M.M.F. asserted that the dismissal order here was not like a dismissal without prejudice in a general civil or criminal case because although the department could file a new case with the same family, the new case would require the department to make new allegations and therefore wouldn’t involve simply refiling the same petition. The court concluded that because the department couldn’t simply refile the same petition, the juvenile court’s dismissal order ended the action and thus constituted a final, appealable order.
On the merits, M.M.F. argued that this case differed from R.M.P. because of the deferred adjudication procedure. M.M.F. maintained that the juvenile court had the authority to enter an adjudication over the department’s motion to dismiss without any action on his part. However, for the court to enter an adjudication after the deferred period, the State has to prosecute the petition through a motion to revoke. The department was unwilling to do so here, so any distinction between R.M.P. and the present case based on the deferred adjudication procedure didn’t confer standing on M.M.F. to prosecute the petition. The juvenile court thus properly dismissed the case.
The judgment was affirmed.