People in re Sanders.
2026 COA 80. No. 25CA1685. Children’s Code—Youth in Foster Care—Foster Youth in Transition Program—Eligibility—Appeals—Magistrates—Petition for Review.
November 5, 2026
Sanders asked the Mesa County Department of Human Services (the department) to find him eligible to participate in the foster youth in transition (FYIT) program under CRS § 19-7-304(3) because he was “in foster care” while in the department’s legal custody. The department determined that he was not eligible. Sanders appealed to the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), which affirmed the department’s determination. Sanders then petitioned in the juvenile court to initiate an FYIT proceeding under § 19-7-307, asserting that he voluntarily consented to enter the FYIT program, and asked the juvenile court to declare him eligible. A magistrate dismissed the petition, concluding that the department has sole authority to determine a youth’s eligibility for the FYIT program. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s order on different grounds. It concluded that while the statutes offer an administrative path and a judicial path for obtaining eligibility determinations, the court lacked authority to review the department’s eligibility determination because Sanders chose to seek an eligibility determination from the department, so any challenge to that determination had to be through the administrative appeal process.
As an initial matter on appeal, the court of appeals held that when a magistrate enters an order in a FYIT proceeding, §§ 19-1-108(3)(a.5) and (5.5) require a party to petition for review of the magistrate’s order with the district court before appealing to the court of appeals. Here, Sanders filed a timely petition for review and then timely appealed the juvenile court’s order adopting the magistrate’s order, so the court had jurisdiction.
On the merits, Sanders argued that both the department and the juvenile court can make independent eligibility determinations for the FYIT program, so his initial choice to apply to the department did not preclude his later request for judicial review. The court concluded that the department has exclusive authority to determine whether a youth is eligible for the FYIT program, subject to the administrative appeal process. Accordingly, it held that the juvenile court may not determine a youth’s eligibility for the FYIT program in an FYIT proceeding. Rather, the county department of human or social services must make that determination, subject to the administrative appeal process. Here, the department and CDHS determined that Sanders was not eligible for the FYIT program, and the juvenile court correctly concluded (on different grounds) that it lacked authority to decide otherwise, so the juvenile court correctly adopted the magistrate’s order dismissing Sanders’s petition.
The judgment was affirmed.