People v. Anderson.

2026 COA 64. No. 22CA1593. Fourth Amendment—Colorado Constitution—Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Search—DNA Evidence—Court Order for Nontestimonial Identification—Motion to Suppress—CRE 404(b)—Prosecutorial Misconduct.

August 20, 2026

In 1981, S.Q.’s father found her dead in her home. S.Q. was partially naked and she had been shot in the head twice and stabbed in the back multiple times. Investigators collected serological evidence from the scene and other items of physical evidence. Semen was found inside S.Q.’s vagina, on the carpet beneath her, and on a towel that covered her face, and investigators took vaginal and anal swabs. At the time, none of the items or serological evidence was DNA-tested because forensic DNA analysis wasn’t available to investigators. But investigators later performed serological and DNA analysis on the evidence and the swabs, and over the years, they developed a DNA profile of the suspected perpetrator. In 2020, using genetic genealogy, a private company identified Anderson and two of his brothers as potential sources of the DNA from the crime scene. Investigators ultimately focused on Anderson, and a police department detective and an investigator with the district attorney’s office sent a company contractor to surreptitiously collect Anderson’s DNA. In 2021, the contractor went to Anderson’s Nebraska home and looked through a publicly shared dumpster at his apartment complex. The contractor found a trash bag that appeared to have Anderson’s trash, from which he collected an empty soda can, among other items. The soda can was DNA tested, and the testing showed that the DNA from the soda can matched DNA found at S.Q.’s murder scene. Based in large part on this DNA match, law enforcement established probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant and a search warrant to seize and test DNA evidence obtained directly from Anderson, who was ultimately linked to the 1981 homicide. Anderson was extradited from Nebraska and charged with two counts of murder in the first degree (after deliberation) and felony murder. Anderson filed pretrial motions to suppress (1) the evidence obtained from the search and seizure of his garbage and the fruits of that search and (2) the evidence obtained from the seizure and DNA testing of genetic material found on the soda can and the fruits of that testing. The court denied both motions, concluding that (1) there was no privacy interest in garbage put out for public pickup; and (2) with respect to genetic material on the soda can, a warrant was not necessary because the evidence was essentially abandoned property. Anderson was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life in Department of Corrections’ custody with discretionary parole after 20 years, which was the maximum sentence applicable at the time of the offense.

On appeal, Anderson argued that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress because investigators did not first obtain a warrant to search and seize his garbage and to perform DNA testing on the genetic material on the soda can. First, both the US Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme Court have held that an individual does not have a reasonable privacy interest in garbage that they leave outside the curtilage of their home for disposal. As to the evidence collected from his garbage and the fruits of that search, the trial court found that Anderson’s garbage was found in a public dumpster along with comingled garbage from other households. This finding supports the conclusion that the garbage was abandoned outside the curtilage of Anderson’s home and was publicly accessible. Accordingly, Anderson no longer had a privacy interest in the soda can or other items collected from his garbage, so investigators didn’t need a warrant to collect and examine his garbage. As to the results of the warrantless DNA testing, Anderson maintained that even if the soda can was lawfully seized, the government still had to obtain a warrant before testing any DNA found on the can because he has a distinct privacy interest in his DNA. Relying on Crim. P. 41.1, which allows the government to collect and test nontestimonial identification evidence (including DNA) from a suspect on less than probable cause, the court of appeals concluded that the warrantless testing of DNA deposited on lawfully obtained abandoned property for the purpose of identification doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment or the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court didn’t err by denying Anderson’s motion to suppress evidence for failure to obtain a search warrant to test his DNA.

Anderson also contended that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial other acts evidence under CRE 404(b). He asserted that the trial court erred by determining that the relevance of the evidence was independent of the inference prohibited by CRE 404(b) and that the probative value wasn’t substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. First, as relevant here, CRE 404(b) allows admission of evidence of other crimes or acts for purposes of identity. Before trial, the People filed a notice of intent to introduce other acts evidence under CRE 404(b) concerning a 1981 attempted murder and burglary in which Anderson similarly entered the home of a female victim, J.L.B., and assaulted her with a deadly weapon. The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible as CRE 404(b) evidence to prove the perpetrator’s identity, and J.L.B. testified about Anderson’s assault on her. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence is relevant independent of the prohibited inference that Anderson has a bad character and acted in conformity with that bad character by killing and sexually assaulting S.Q. Second, the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the perpetrator’s identity was the primary issue in this case, the evidence to prove Anderson’s identity as the perpetrator was strong but limited, and the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Anderson’s assault on J.L.B.

Anderson further asserted that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct in a statement made and a slide shown during closing argument. Here, the prosecutor’s statement requesting that the jury “hold [Anderson] accountable” wasn’t improper because it followed the prosecutor’s discussion of how the DNA evidence introduced at trial established Anderson’s guilt and was framed as a request that the jury hold Anderson accountable because he was guilty. Second, even assuming the use of a slide showing S.Q.’s unclothed body from the waist down lying on the floor—which was admitted at trial—was improper, it was harmless given that it was a brief part of a proper accountability argument made in the middle of closing argument and the jury couldn’t see any injuries to S.Q. in the slide.

The judgment was affirmed.