People v. Bolden.
2026 COA 17. No. 24CA0096. Criminal Theft—Evidence of Value—Jury Instructions.
March 19, 2026
Bolden and his co-defendant went to a store, placed merchandise in their shopping carts, and then left the store without paying for the items. A jury found that Bolden stole items valued at more than $2,000 from a retail store, and Bolden was convicted of felony theft.
On appeal, Bolden argued that on the day of the theft, the stolen items were on sale, so there was insufficient evidence to sustain his felony conviction. Under CRS § 18-4-401(2)(e) (f), theft is a misdemeanor if the value of the items is less than $2,000, but it is a class 6 felony if the items have a value of $2,000 or more but less than $5,000. Under § 18-4-414(1), evidence of the retail value of the stolen item is prima facie evidence of the item’s value. Evidence of retail value includes, among other things, labels, tags, and signs. So, while the discounted sale price is evidence of value, it does not establish value as a matter of law. Here, the parties agreed that, at the time of the theft, the discounted sale price of the stolen items totaled $1,856.19. But on the record, which contains conflicting evidence of the value of the stolen items, a jury could reasonably find that the nondiscounted ticket prices were indicative of value.
Bolden also contended that the trial court erred by rejecting two tendered jury instructions on the valuation of the stolen merchandise. The tendered instructions cautioned the jury against accepting “speculative” evidence of value. First, while the instructions might be an accurate statement of the law, no case suggests that the court should have imported that language into a jury instruction. Second, the concepts of the proffered instructions were incorporated into a separate instruction. And the instructions’ language didn’t fit the case circumstances because both parties had presented competent and detailed evidence of the merchandise’s value.
Bolden further asserted that the court’s failure to give an instruction on reasonable market value permitted the jury to ignore dispositive evidence of retail market value, which he maintained was the discounted sale price, and to instead accept the retailer’s ticket price as the items’ value. But as discussed above, an item’s price is not dispositive of its value. Further, the instruction was unnecessary, because there was no real dispute about the correct measure of value; rather, the dispute centered on how to determine the items’ fair market value. And the court correctly noted the lack of authority to support giving the instruction and that courts should avoid devising a jury instruction using language from case law.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.