People v. Claycomb.
2025 COA 36. No. 23CA1112. Jury Instructions—Definitional Instructions—Proximate Cause—Instructions Regarding Continued Deliberation.
April 3, 2025
Claycomb was involved in a two-vehicle collision with Melanson and his wife, who were ejected from their vehicle and killed. Claycomb was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, one count of reckless driving, one count of speeding, and one count of violation of bond conditions that was later dismissed. The defense’s theory was that the Melansons’ truck proximately caused the accident as it proceeded into an intersection from a stop sign. Claycomb asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of careless driving, define the culpable mental state for careless driving, and give an intervening cause instruction. The court gave the careless driving elemental instruction but declined to define the mental state for careless driving or give an intervening cause instruction. About an hour and a half into deliberations, the jury asked two questions regarding how long it had to deliberate. The trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberating. The jury later asked for a definition of “proximate cause.” Over defense counsel’s objection, the court referred the jury to the original instructions and told it to use the common meanings of undefined terms in the instructions. Shortly before 5 p.m., the trial court gave the jury a “getting close to 5 instruction,” asking the jury to indicate whether it wanted to break for the day, was close to reaching a verdict and wanted to continue deliberating until 5:30 p.m., or had reached a verdict. The jury chose to continue deliberating and reached a verdict just before 5:30 p.m. Claycomb was convicted of careless driving resulting in death and speeding at least 25 mph over the speed limit.
On appeal, Claycomb argued that the trial court reversibly erred by not instructing the jury on the meaning of “without due regard” as used in the careless driving elemental instruction. He asserted that his proposed instruction was necessary to avoid confusing the jury because “reckless” was the only mental state defined in the instructions. A definitional instruction is not required for terms or phrases that are familiar to a reasonable person of common intelligence, especially when a term’s meaning is not so technical that it creates juror confusion. Here, while it would have been within the trial court’s discretion to separately instruct the jury on the meaning of “without due regard,” the careless driving instruction tracked the statutory language and the model criminal jury instruction, and no binding Colorado precedent requires a separate instruction for the culpable mental state of careless driving. Further, “without due regard” is not so technical as to create juror confusion; and the jury did not express confusion about the term, which does not have a statutory definition, so the jury should have given the phrase its ordinary meaning. And the definition of “without due regard” in Claycomb’s tendered instructions did not accurately quote the definition of that term in relevant case law.
Claycomb also contended that even if the trial court properly concluded that his tendered instruction was not appropriate, it had to sua sponte provide a correct jury instruction. However, any error was not obvious because the model criminal jury instructions do not define the culpable mental state for careless driving, and no authority requires such an instruction to be given. Therefore, the trial court did not err by declining to give the jury Claycomb’s tendered instruction for the culpable mental state for careless driving.
Claycomb also asserted that the trial court erred by rejecting his intervening cause instruction. The trial court rejected this proposed instruction because it disagreed that the Melansons’ truck entering the intersection was an independent, intervening cause. Here, because the Melansons’ actions were not unforeseeable gross negligence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Claycomb was not entitled to an intervening cause instruction.
Claycomb further argued that the trial court erred by not defining “proximate cause” after the jury asked for a definition of the phrase. The court of appeals concluded that when the jury asks for a definition of “proximate cause” and that phrase is used in the jury instructions, the trial court must provide a definition. Here, the original instructions did not clearly answer the jury’s question as to the meaning of proximate cause, and proximate cause is an element of vehicular homicide, so the court should have clarified the phrase. Accordingly, the trial court erred, but the error was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence that Claycomb’s careless driving was the proximate cause of the Melansons’ deaths.
Lastly, Claycomb contended that the trial court reversibly erred by instructing the jury regarding continued deliberations without first inquiring regarding the possibility of an impasse, and that the coercive impact of the trial court’s instruction to continue deliberating was compounded by the court’s “getting close to 5” instruction. Here, the jury’s questions did not indicate that the jury was deadlocked or unable to reach a verdict, or that further deliberations were not likely to result in a verdict; and the trial court’s response to continue deliberating was not coercive. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury to continue deliberating in response to the questions submitted an hour and a half into deliberations. And because the court’s instruction to continue deliberating did not coerce the jury, there was no coercion to be compounded by the “getting close to 5” instruction.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.