People v. Crawley.
2024 COA 49. No. 23CA0282. Second-Degree Murder—Eighth Amendment—Cruel and Unusual Punishments—Proportionality Review—Per Se Grave or Serious Offenses.
May 9, 2024
While driving 163 miles per hour and under the influence of alcohol, Crawley struck another vehicle, killing its two passengers. Crawley, his friend, and the driver of the other vehicle were severely injured. A blood alcohol test showed that Crawley’s blood alcohol content was over two times the legal limit. Crawley pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). The plea agreement specified that the sentences would be open to the court but would run concurrently and that the sentencing range for misdemeanor DUI was five days to one year and the sentencing range for second-degree murder was 16 to 48 years. The district court sentenced Crawley to 48 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections based on the two deaths and the severity of the other injuries. Crawley filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief challenging the 48-year sentence on the basis that it was grossly disproportionate to his conduct because his actions were more like vehicular homicide than second-degree murder. The postconviction court ruled that, even assuming that Crawley’s conduct was more similar to vehicular homicide DUI, that offense is per se grave and serious, so Crawley’s sentence did not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality and an extended proportionality review was not required. The court conducted an abbreviated proportionality review and denied the motion without a hearing.
On appeal, Crawley argued that his sentence is disproportionately harsh when compared to his conduct because his conduct was more like vehicular homicide than second-degree murder, so vehicular homicide should be the applicable offense for the proportionality review. However, Crawley pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, thus admitting that he committed each of the elements of second-degree murder. And in his plea agreement, Crawley waived the right to challenge his admission that he knowingly caused a person’s death. Therefore, second-degree murder is the applicable offense.
Crawley also contended that vehicular homicide is not per se grave or serious, and neither was his underlying conduct, so his sentence is disproportionately harsh when compared to his conduct. Colorado courts conduct a two-step analysis when considering a proportionality challenge: an abbreviated proportionality review, in which the court compares the gravity and seriousness of the offense with the harshness of the penalty; and an extended proportionality review, in which the court compares the challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes in the same jurisdiction and the same crime in other jurisdictions. Courts proceed to the second step only when the comparison between the gravity and seriousness of the offense and the harshness of the penalty gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality. Some crimes are designated per se grave or serious for purposes of a proportionality review, and for these crimes, courts may skip the fact-focused gravity or seriousness analysis and proceed directly to considering the harshness of the penalty. Applying Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, the court of appeals determined that second-degree murder is per se grave or serious. Courts rarely conclude that a sentence is grossly disproportionate when a crime has a per se grave or serious designation. Here, Crawley’s 48-year sentence was within the range for second-degree murder and within the stipulated range under the plea agreement. Accordingly, Crawley’s sentence does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.
Crawley further argued that his 48-year sentence is unduly harsh because he has no prior felony convictions. While this is a factor to be considered, it does not outweigh the fact that Crawley’s per se grave or serious crime resulted in the deaths of two victims and significant injuries to others. Further, as stated above, Crawley’s sentence was within the range for second-degree murder and the stipulated range under the plea agreement, and Crawley will be eligible for parole after serving 75% of his sentence. Accordingly, there is no inference of gross disproportionality, and an extended proportionality review is not warranted.
The order was affirmed.