People v. Evans.
2026 COA 31. No. 23CA1597. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Plea Bargains—Soft Versus Firm Offer—Right to a Hearing.
April 30, 2026
Evans was found guilty of burglary and felony murder in connection with a home invasion that involved the shooting death of the homeowner. The jury specifically found that Evans was not the shooter, and the evidence did not conclusively establish that he was present at the scene of the burglary. The court imposed a mandatory sentence of life without parole for the felony murder conviction. Evans moved for postconviction relief, arguing that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations by not advising him of his potential exposure as a complicitor and of his parole eligibility. Evans maintained that taken together, his lawyer’s failures prevented him from properly evaluating whether to accept a “soft” plea offer of 27 years, so he rejected it. Following a hearing, the district court denied the parole eligibility claim on the ground that Evans failed to establish that the prosecution had made a firm plea offer. The court separately summarily denied the intertwined complicity claim.
On appeal, Evans contended that the court misapplied the law in denying his parole eligibility claim because he wasn’t required to establish the existence of a firm offer; rather, he only had to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the parties’ negotiations would have resulted in a firm offer that he would have accepted. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984), to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was thus was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Here, the district court reasoned that the lack of a firm offer, not counsel’s errors, precluded Evans from accepting a plea deal. But Evans argued that but for counsel’s failure to properly advise him of the consequences of accepting a 27-year offer, a firm offer would have materialized. Under United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1998), and United States v. Brooks, Nos. 10-20078, 14-2624, 2015 WL 5837636, at *4 (D.Kan. Oct. 6, 2015) (unpublished opinion), the district court erred by focusing exclusively on the existence of a firm offer. Further, because the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea bargaining stage, the court erred in reasoning that counsel did not have any duty to advise Evans about the possible offer. Accordingly, the court applied the wrong legal standard to the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis. And on the record here, the parole eligibility claim does not fail as a matter of law.
Evans also argued that the court erred by denying his complicity claim without a hearing because he alleged facts that, if true, would establish ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintained that as a result of counsel’s failures, he did not understand that he could be convicted of felony murder under a complicity theory. And that misunderstanding combined with his lack of information about parole eligibility led him to reject the plea offer. The district court reasoned that counsel’s failure to explain complicity could not have prejudiced Evans because the indictment put Evans on notice that he could be found guilty of felony murder even if he did not shoot the victim. But Evans’s claim was not that he was unaware of his potential exposure as a principal under the felony murder statute. Rather, he claimed that the prosecution got a felony murder conviction on a complicity theory; his lawyer never advised him of that possibility; and the lawyer’s failure to explain his exposure under that theory of liability led him to overestimate his chances at trial and reject the soft offer. Here, if Evans’s lawyer should have properly advised him about complicity but did not, and as a result Evans rejected a soft offer that could have developed into a firm offer, he may be entitled to relief. But whether there is a reasonable probability that the soft offer would have become a firm offer has not been determined. Accordingly, Evans is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The orders were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.