People v. Feldman.
2024 COA 119. No. 22CA0792. Government Officers—Coroner—Cause and Manner of Death—Constitutional Law—Separation of Powers—Subdelegation Doctrine—Expert Testimony—Lay Testimony—CRE 404(a).
November 7, 2024
Feldman and the victim were married. He called 911 to report that the victim was unconscious in the bathtub with the shower running. Emergency personnel found the victim lying naked on her back on the bathroom floor. Feldman stated that he had pulled her out of the bathtub. The victim was covered with abrasions and bruises and had no pulse. An autopsy showed that she had sustained almost all of the injuries before her death. A forensic pathologist discovered that the victim had an enlarged heart and other chronic health conditions, including kidney disease and obesity, and the pathologist could not determine the cause and manner of the victim’s death. Police subsequently found out that Feldman had been having an affair with S.M. before the victim’s death, and S.M. had told the victim about the affair the morning of her death. The police investigated the matter further and consulted Dr. Smock, an expert in strangulation and forensic medicine. Dr. Smock opined that the victim had died from a combination of strangulation and suffocation. Feldman was charged with first degree murder. Defense counsel moved pretrial to exclude Dr. Smock’s testimony about the cause and manner of the victim’s death, and the district court denied the motion. Feldman was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Feldman argued that the district court erred by allowing the prosecution to usurp the county coroner’s authority by presenting Dr. Smock’s testimony regarding the cause and manner of the victim’s death, because this violated the subdelegation doctrine. The subdelegation doctrine prevents an agency within one governmental branch from delegating its authority to a coequal agency within the same branch. Even assuming that the district attorney’s office and the coroner’s office are coequal agencies within the executive branch, Feldman failed to show that the subdelegation doctrine applies in Colorado. Further, even if the subdelegation doctrine applies in Colorado, the doctrine does not apply here because the coroner and forensic pathologist performed their duties without delegating them to the district attorney’s office. Rather, the prosecution exercised its prosecutorial authority by presenting evidence at Feldman’s trial about how the victim died, which was an issue for the jury to decide.
Feldman alternatively argued that if the coroner is part of the legislative branch, the prosecution, as part of the executive branch, violated the separation of powers doctrine by introducing Dr. Smock’s testimony. However, Feldman produced no support for his contention that the coroner is part of the legislative branch, so this argument failed.
Feldman further contended that the district court erred by admitting Dr. Smock’s testimony, asserting that Dr. Smock was not qualified to testify about the cause and manner of the victim’s death because he is not a forensic pathologist and his testimony was thus unreliable. However, a district court’s reliability determination is based on the totality of the circumstances and considers the witness’s subject matter expertise, so whether Dr. Smock is a forensic pathologist is not dispositive of this issue. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Smock as an expert and allowing his testimony, given Dr. Smock’s extensive experience in clinical forensic medicine and strangulation. Further, his testimony was not speculative or argumentative and did not amount to improper bolstering.
Feldman also asserted that the district court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial after the jury heard testimony from Malman, the victim’s aunt, that the victim had stated that Feldman would kill her before he let her leave him. Defense counsel objected to Malman’s testimony, and the district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard Malman’s testimony. Though Malman’s testimony was inadmissible, it did not warrant a mistrial because the statement was fleeting; the prosecution did not intentionally elicit the statement; and the curative instruction sufficiently remedied any error.
Feldman additionally argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting, as evidence of motive and intent, testimony from his close friend Smith about Feldman’s allegedly disingenuous expressions of emotions and comments concerning the victim’s ailing health. CRE 404(a) permits a lay witness to give a summary opinion of another person’s motivation and intent where the witness personally observed the other person’s physical activity and the witness summarizes their sensory impressions of such activity. Here, the prosecution laid a sufficient foundation that Smith had personally observed Feldman’s behavior and knew Feldman well enough to characterize his expressions of emotions and comments about the victim’s ailing health as disingenuous. Accordingly, this testimony was not improper.
Lastly, because the court of appeals found no errors, it rejected Feldman’s argument that cumulative error warrants reversal.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.