People v. Gillespie.
2024 COA 98. No. 22CA0897. Cruelty to Animals—Torture—Needlessly Kill—Fourth Amendment—Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Entry—Exigent Circumstances—Sufficiency of Evidence.
August 29, 2024
Gillespie adopted a dog, Henri, from the Humane Society. Henri suffered from intense panic and anxiety attacks, and when left alone, he destroyed things and attempted to escape. Gillespie made several unsuccessful efforts to manage Henri’s destructive behavior, including medication and crating. Gillespie also tried tethering Henri in the backyard, but a neighbor complained that he was getting his tether tangled in debris and could still jump over the fence. Responding to the complaint, a Mesa County Animal Services (MCAS) officer warned her that Henri could strangle himself if he got outside of the fence while still on the tether, so Gillespie made efforts to adjust the tether. MCAS intervened again as neighbors continued to report that Henri was regularly tangled in his tether, would bark and cry for hours even when not tangled, and was left regularly without access to water, food, or adequate shelter. Ultimately, while Gillespie was at work, a neighbor alerted MCAS that she noticed that Henri was tangled and struggling in the backyard. MCAS Officer LeMaster arrived at Gillespie’s home and was unable to contact her at the front door, so he left a note. He then noticed that the driveway went beyond the house into the backyard, so he walked up the driveway toward the back of the house, intending to place another note on the back door. Rounding the corner toward the back of the house, LeMaster saw Henri inside a chain-link fence lying on his side with his tether tangled in a root cluster. LeMaster determined that Henri was unresponsive, so he entered the backyard and found that Henri had died and rigor mortis was setting in. LeMaster then returned to his truck and called his supervisor, who told LeMaster to return to the backyard, collect the dog’s body and related evidence, and photograph the scene. LeMaster did so without obtaining a warrant. Gillespie was charged with animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty. She moved to suppress the evidence that LeMaster obtained, but the trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the plain view doctrine justified the warrantless searches and the seizure of Henri’s body. Gillespie was convicted of one count of aggravated animal cruelty and one count of animal cruelty.
On appeal, Gillespie argued that her aggravated animal cruelty conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. To prove animal cruelty, the prosecution had to establish that Gillespie either knowingly tortured or knowingly needlessly killed Henri. Here, the evidence showed that Gillespie did not provide Henri adequate shelter or water in the height of the summer and tethered him in a way that required him to be rescued from being tangled on numerous occasions. Accordingly, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Gillespie knowingly tortured Henri. However, the prosecution’s evidence did not support a reasonable inference that Gillespie knew her use of a single tie-out system was almost certain to lead to Henri’s death; at most, one officer told her that the system she was using could possibly kill Henri. Therefore, the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Gillespie knowingly needlessly killed Henri.
Gillespie also contended that the trial court reversibly erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized from the searches of her backyard. Here, even if LeMaster trespassed by walking up Gillespie’s driveway after failing to contact her at the front door, he did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search while doing so because he made no attempt to gather information from Gillespie’s property. Then, when Henri came into view, LeMaster reasonably concluded that exigent circumstances required him to enter the backyard to assess Henri’s condition and render aid. Accordingly, LeMaster’s first entry onto the driveway, his discovery of Henri, and his entry into the backyard to assess Henri’s condition did not violate the Fourth Amendment. However, the trial court did not distinguish between LeMaster’s first entry onto the driveway and his subsequent entry to collect Henri’s body and document the scene. While probable cause existed for the second entry, LeMaster’s fear that Henri’s body would decompose so quickly that it would be impossible to determine the cause of death was insufficient to constitute an exigent circumstance to justify LeMaster’s warrantless entry. Therefore, LeMaster’s second entry was unconstitutional, and the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence gathered therefrom. Further, the failure to suppress the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.