People v. Hill.
2025 COA 12. No. 24CA0347. First Degree Criminal Trespass—Unlawful Entry by Ruse, Trickery, or Deception—Judgment of Acquittal.
January 30, 2025
Hill was charged with first degree criminal trespass. According to the prosecution’s evidence, Hill was employed by a bond company as a bail bondsman and was tasked with apprehending Madrid for outstanding arrest warrants. Hill tracked Madrid to an apartment that Madrid’s brother leased in an apartment complex owned by Perry Properties. Hill went to the complex’s leasing office wearing tactical gear, including a vest with insignias identifying him as a “fugitive recovery agent” for an unspecified “warrant division.” Hill spoke to several Perry Properties employees (collectively, the Perry employees) at the leasing office, telling them that he had warrants for Madrid’s arrest and that he had “pinged” Madrid at the apartment’s location. He requested permission to enter Madrid’s brother’s apartment to take Madrid into custody. The Perry employees assumed that Hill was a member of a police department or other law enforcement agency and, based on this assumption, the property manager directed the maintenance technician to open the apartment for Hill. Once he was inside the apartment, Hill confronted Madrid, who pointed a gun out the apartment’s front door. Hill backed out and fired his gun but didn’t hit anyone. After the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Hill moved for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that because Hill had permission to enter the apartment, a reasonable juror could not find that he had unlawfully entered the apartment or that he knew his entry was unlawful.
On appeal, the People argued that the district court misinterpreted the mens rea requirement for criminal trespass by improperly applying the mental state “knowingly” to both the “entry” and “unlawful” elements of first degree criminal trespass. They maintained that the jury only needed to find that Hill knowingly entered the apartment, not that Hill knew his entry was unlawful, for a conviction. Under CRS § 18-4-502(1)(a), a person commits first degree criminal trespass by knowingly and unlawfully entering or remaining in another’s dwelling. Pursuant to § 18-1-501(6), a person acts knowingly by being aware that their conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. And under § 18-4-502(1)(a), if a person obtains permission to enter a dwelling by means of ruse, trickery, or deception, the person enters “unlawfully” for purposes of first degree criminal trespass. Thus, if there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Hill gained entry by means of a ruse, trickery, or deception, the jury could conclude that his entry was unlawful. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could reasonably infer that Hill used his clothing and manner to deceive the Perry employees into believing he was a law enforcement officer to secure their permission and assistance to enter the apartment. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Hill’s entry was unlawful because he obtained his authorization to enter by means of “ruse, trickery, or deception.” So even if the prosecution needed to prove that Hill knew his entry was unlawful, there was sufficient evidence for the case to have been submitted to the jury. Further, there was sufficient evidence to show that Hill knew his entry was unlawful because a jury could have reasonably inferred that Hill was aware that the Perry employees wouldn’t have granted such permission unless they believed he was a law enforcement officer. The district court thus erred by ruling that there wasn’t sufficient evidence to submit the matter to the jury and granting the judgment of acquittal.
The ruling granting the judgment of acquittal was disapproved.