People v. Jargowsky.
2026 COA 66. No. 24CA1018. Searches and Seizures—Court Orders for Records Production—Out-of-State Businesses—Motions to Suppress—Hearsay—Expert Testimony—Jury Instructions—Cumulative Error.
September 3, 2026
Jargowsky and her husband owned Top Dollar Pawn, LLC (Top Dollar), which operated four pawnshops in the area of Colorado Springs and Pueblo. Jargowsky managed one of the pawnshops in Pueblo (the Highway 50 pawnshop). In 2019, retail crime investigators from Home Depot, Walmart, and Target reported to the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) that Top Dollar was selling a very large volume of new-in-box items on eBay. CSPD detectives visited local pawnshops and found that Top Shop had a much higher volume of new-in-box items than the other pawnshops. Detective Mace testified that a typical Top Dollar store would have 60% to 70% new-in-box items, whereas a typical pawn shop would have 5% or less new-in-box items. Detective Mace also observed that Top Dollar was selling mostly new-in-box items on its eBay account, and many of those items matched the descriptions of items reportedly stolen from retail stores in the Colorado Springs area. Mace executed affidavits establishing probable cause, citing the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 USC § 2703(c), and the district court issued search warrants for the production of records from 10 businesses and banks located outside Colorado and six located within Colorado but outside El Paso County. CSPD later identified 27 “completed circles” of money laundering—instances where law enforcement tracked a stolen or apparently stolen item from the time Top Dollar purchased it to the time Top Dollar resold it on eBay. Jargowsky moved to suppress the records obtained from the search warrants, arguing that the SCA did not apply and that Colorado judges lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court found that CRS § 16-3-301.1 authorized it to order the production of records, rejecting the argument that the warrants were invalid because they cited an inapplicable statute. Jargowsky was charged with 27 counts of money laundering, one count of theft (later dismissed), and one count of engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity under the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA). She was found guilty of the racketeering charge and three counts of money laundering and was sentenced to eight years in community corrections.
On appeal, Jargowsky argued that the district court lacked authority to order the production of records located outside Colorado and thus erred by denying her motions to suppress. First, Jargowsky relied on four cases to support her argument that without a uniform act or explicit grant of federal authority, Colorado courts lack authority outside of the state. But the cited cases do not stand for that proposition and are inapplicable here. Further, contrary to Jargowsky’s argument, Colorado has authority to regulate entities that conduct business within its borders. By choosing to do business in Colorado, entities are subject to the requirement to produce records under § 16-3-301.1, regardless of where they are headquartered. Accordingly, the Colorado General Assembly did not exceed its authority by enacting § 16-3-301.1. Second, the district court did not clearly err by determining that the “business entity” definition in § 16-3-301.1(11)(b) encompasses the businesses subject to the warrants for the production of records in this case.
Jargowsky also contended that the district court erred by denying her motions to suppress because § 16-3-305(1.5) prevented the district court from ordering the production of records located within Colorado but outside El Paso County. However, the relevant statute here is § 16-3-301.1, which contains no jurisdictional limit.
Jargowsky also maintained that the district court erred in denying her motions to suppress because Mace’s citation of the SCA in his probable cause affidavit invalidates the warrants. But Jargowsky cited no authority to suggest that not including the correct legal authority in the warrant affidavit or the warrant itself invalidates the warrant. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motions to suppress.
Jargowsky additionally asserted that the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, specifically, Mace’s testimony about statements made to him by retail store crime investigators; documents generated from the online database LeadsOnline, which compiles pawnshop transaction data for law enforcement; and screenshots Mace took of eBay records. Here, the retail crime investigators statements were admitted only to show why Mace began investigating Top Dollar, so the court did not err by ruling that the statements were not hearsay. Second, Jargowsky was a Top Dollar owner, and she managed the Highway 50 pawnshop and was in charge of its employees who created the LeadsOnline records, so the records were properly attributed to her as statements of a party opponent under CRE 801(d)(2)(D). And third, the screenshots were not hearsay because they contained statements by a party opponent’s agents, computer-generated data not made by a “declarant,” and statements that were not offered for their truth. Further, any error in admitting the LeadsOnline records or eBay screenshots would be harmless because this evidence was cumulative and there is no reasonable probability that admission of these records substantially influenced the verdict on the counts for which Jargowsky was convicted.
Jargowsky also argued that the district court erred by allowing a senior Walmart manager and a Home Depot retail crime investigator to provide expert testimony about retail theft without being endorsed as experts. However, even assuming without deciding that some of the challenged testimony could be construed as expert testimony, the admission of such testimony did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the trial’s fairness, so any error was harmless.
Jargowsky further contended that the undercover police officer who sold her certain items did not testify at trial, so the district court violated her right to confrontation by admitting a video recording of the transaction. However, the officer’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, so the district court did not err by admitting the video recording.
Jargowsky additionally maintained that the district court erred by denying her counsel’s proposed affirmative defense instructions on mistake of fact and mistake of law. But Jargowsky was not entitled to either instruction, so there was no error.
Lastly, Jargowsky argued for reversal based on cumulative error. Having assumed two errors that do not warrant reversal and did not substantially prejudice Jargowsky’s right to a fair trial, the court of appeals found no reversible cumulative error.
The judgment was affirmed.