People v. Jones.
2025 COA 43. No. 23CA0590. Character Evidence—Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts—CRE 404(b)—Witness Credibility—Jury Instructions.
May 1, 2025
Jones lived with his girlfriend D.S., who was the foster mother of 14-month-old A.S. One morning, Jones carried A.S. downstairs by the ankles, bouncing him up and down. D.S. cautioned Jones about hurting A.S. Several minutes later, Jones brought A.S. upstairs and laid him on an ottoman. When D.S. came into the room, she heard A.S. gasping for air, and his body appeared limp. D.S. asked Jones what he had done, and he said that he had tossed A.S. down, and had done it before. As D.S. dialed 911, Jones told her not to tell anyone he was there and to say that A.S. fell. D.S. then told the dispatcher that A.S. had fallen off a bed. A.S. died from blunt force head trauma, and doctors discovered many older injuries to his body that were consistent with abuse. Jones was charged with first degree murder for knowingly causing the death of a child under the age of 12 while in a position of trust, and D.S. was charged with accessory to first degree murder. D.S. pleaded guilty and agreed to testify truthfully against Jones. At trial, the prosecution relied on D.S.’s testimony and evidence showing that Jones had previously abused A.S., as well as D.S. and A.S.’s sibling N.A. Jones’s defense theory was that the prosecution couldn’t prove the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt because no one saw what had happened, and D.S. had fabricated her testimony to secure a better plea agreement. Jones was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Jones contended that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior abusive behavior toward D.S. because that evidence was barred by CRE 404(b). Evidence of a defendant’s other acts is subject to the four-part test in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). Jones argued that evidence of his prior abusive behavior toward D.S. didn’t satisfy the first and fourth Spoto prongs, which inquire whether the evidence relates to a material fact and whether the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Jones contended that the evidence didn’t relate to a material fact because the jury considered it only to assess D.S.’s credibility, which isn’t an element of first degree murder. But the first prong of the Spoto test is satisfied if the purpose for which the prior act evidence is offered is somehow probative of an ultimate fact. Here, D.S.’s credibility was crucial. Evidence that Jones previously abused D.S. informed why she repeatedly lied to law enforcement about A.S.’s death, and it was probative of her credibility and therefore relevant to the jury’s determination. Further, while the evidence had a risk of undue prejudice, this risk did not substantially outweigh its probative value. And the district court minimized any prejudicial effect by contemporaneously instructing the jury to consider it only for the purpose of assessing D.S.’s credibility. Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Jones’s prior abusive behavior toward D.S. under CRE 404(b).
Jones also contended that the trial judge should have disqualified himself because of certain statements he made about a recorded phone call Jones made to D.S. However, the judge never said that he believed Jones was guilty, and the judge’s characterization of Jones’s statements during the call was accurate. Therefore, there was no basis for disqualification.
Jones further argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of A.S.’s injuries under CRE 404(b) to show that he had previously abused A.S. The court of appeals held that when the defense in a criminal case attacks a witness’s credibility, evidence of the defendant’s previous abuse of the witness may be admissible under CRE 404(b) to buttress the witness’s credibility if it could explain the witness’s reluctance to testify or the witness’s changed accounts. Here, over defense counsel’s objection, the prosecution sought to admit this evidence under CRE 404(b) to prove identity, intent, lack of accident, and position of trust with regard to Jones’s relationship to A.S. The court ruled that the prosecution could admit the proffered evidence under CRE 404(b) to prove identity, lack of accident, and position of trust, and the court gave contemporaneous and written limiting instructions about the purposes for which the jurors could consider this evidence of A.S.’s injuries. The evidence satisfied the threshold admissibility requirement under CRE 404(b), and Jones didn’t otherwise challenge its admissibility to prove identity, lack of accident, and position of trust. Therefore, the court acted within its discretion by admitting evidence of A.S.’s injuries to show that Jones had previously abused him.
Jones further asserted that the district court improperly instructed the jury on evidence of A.S.’s and N.A.’s injuries. However, the court repeatedly instructed the jury that it was admitting evidence of A.S.’s and N.A.’s injuries for the limited purpose of establishing identity and lack of accident, so giving the instruction was not plain error.
Lastly, given the absence of multiple errors, the court rejected Jones’s cumulative error argument.
The judgment was affirmed.