People v. Martinez.

2026 COA 7. No. 24CA1501. Postconviction Remedies—Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V)—Denial Without Evidentiary Hearing—Decision Based on Pleadings.

February 12, 2026

Martinez was convicted of second degree assault, two counts of child abuse, and 13 counts of violating a protection order. The district court imposed a controlling sentence of 14 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for second degree assault, with shorter concurrent sentences on the remaining convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Martinez then moved for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct. The postconviction court appointed counsel for Martinez, who supplemented the postconviction motion. The prosecution responded to the supplemental motion, and the court subsequently denied Martinez’s motion without a hearing.

On appeal, Martinez argued that the postconviction court did not apply the correct legal standard when denying his motion and supplement without a hearing. He asserted that the Rule 35(c)(3)(V) phrase “based on the pleadings” limits the postconviction court’s review to only the briefing on the motion, not the files and case record, but the court denied the motion by relying on transcripts and exhibits from the jury trial. Martinez thus contended that the court committed reversible error by relying on information outside the pleadings. Under Rule 35(c)(3)(IV), when initially reviewing a Rule 35(c) motion, a court may deny the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing if the court’s review of the motion, files, and case record establish that the defendant is not entitled to relief. But if the court does not deny the motion based on such review, it must refer the matter to the Office of the Public Defender if counsel is requested. And following the parties’ briefing, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion unless it finds that, “based on the pleadings,” it is appropriate to enter a ruling without holding a hearing. The Court concluded that the phrase “based on the pleadings” in Rule 35(c)(3)(V) allows a postconviction court, when determining whether to conduct a hearing, to consider the materials within the files and case record that are either attached to or referenced in the defendant’s Rule 35 motion (including any supplemental motion) or the parties’ briefing on the motion. Here, the postconviction court’s order relied only on the parts of the record that were cited in the parties’ pleadings or attached to their pleadings. Therefore, the court did not err in denying Martinez’s motion without a hearing under Rule 35(c)(3)(V). And to the extent the court applied the initial review standard from subsection (c)(3)(IV), the error was harmless because no hearing was necessary under the proper standard.

Martinez also argued that the postconviction court erred by denying his request for the release of information about a juror who informed the court that she did not “feel comfortable” returning to deliberations the next day. He maintained that because the record did not rule out potential overt coercive acts that may have made the juror not want to return to deliberations the next day, the postconviction court’s refusal to release additional juror information hampered his counsel’s ability to investigate the possibility that such acts occurred. Here, the court encouraged the juror to relax for the evening and return the next day, and if things did not improve, to notify the foreperson. The juror returned the next day and continued to deliberate, no jurors subsequently reported any misconduct to the court or the parties, and the jury rendered its verdicts. Postconviction counsel filed a motion requesting juror contact information to allow access to the juror, which the postconviction court granted in part. The court also granted both of counsel’s subsequent requests for additional time to contact and interview the juror. Four months later, postconviction counsel filed a supplemental postconviction motion renewing her request for disclosure of additional juror contact information, noting that the defense investigator was still trying to contact the juror. The court noted that the motion provided no additional evidence regarding the alleged juror misconduct and simply restated the argument from the prior motion. The court thus found no overt juror misconduct and denied counsel’s request. Given the lack of record evidence showing prejudice from jury misconduct, along with CRE 606(b)’s aim of protecting jurors and their deliberations, the postconviction court’s decision against releasing juror contact information was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misunderstanding of the law. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.

The order was affirmed.