People v. Melara.
2025 COA 48. No. 23CA1125. Model Jury Instructions—Presumption of Innocence—Burden of Proof—Reasonable Doubt—Lack of Evidence Presented—Plea Offer—Scope of Expert’s Testimony—Severance of Charges—Child Hearsay—Cumulative Error.
May 15, 2025
Melara was charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child (position of trust)—one concerning his daughter and the other concerning his granddaughter—and an aggravated sexual offense sentence enhancer. The charges were joined for trial. Defense counsel moved to sever the separate charges arising out of the assaults against the daughter and the granddaughter, but the trial court denied the motion and proceeded to trial on both counts. The trial court then declared a mistrial based on a hung jury. The trial court set the matter for retrial. Defense counsel and the prosecution discussed a possible community-based plea but were unable to reach an agreement. The case then proceeded to trial before a different judge. Melara was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a combined term of 30 years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
On appeal, Melara argued that the trial court reversibly erred by giving the 2022 version of the Colorado model jury instruction defining reasonable doubt (2022 instruction), which did not expressly refer to the jury’s ability to base its verdict on the lack of evidence in the case. He maintained that using the 2022 instruction violated his due process rights because it failed to advise the jurors that they could consider a lack of evidence, which impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. An instruction that lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof below reasonable doubt constitutes structural error and requires reversal. The court of appeals concluded that as part of the reasonable doubt instruction, a trial court should inform the jury that it may consider the lack of evidence in the case. Therefore, the trial court should have included the “lack of evidence” language in the instruction. However, the omission of that phrase did not impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof in this case because the 2022 instruction required the jury to ensure that there was not “a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty” of “the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” which accurately states the law, and the instruction emphasized that the jury had to be “firmly convinced of [Melara’s] guilt.” Further, the 2022 instruction did not dissuade the jurors from using their common sense when considering the evidence, including issues or requirements that the evidence did not address. Therefore, the trial court did not err.
Melara also contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion to compel the prosecution to leave the plea offer open after he made a counteroffer. A plea offer must be accepted within a reasonable time, and a defendant who rejects an offer has no right to insist on its performance. Further, if a defendant makes a counteroffer, the prior offer is typically deemed rejected as a matter of law. Here, Melara did not accept the initial offer and did not ask the court to specifically enforce it. Rather, he proceeded to trial and only asked for specific performance of the offer after he was convicted. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for specific performance of the offer.
Melara further asserted that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of his expert witness’s testimony to exclude some opinions that the same expert was allowed to offer in connection with the first trial. He maintained that the trial court’s rulings concerning the scope of the permitted testimony at the first trial became the law of the case that was binding at the subsequent trial. However, no legal authority supports this argument, and the law of the case doctrine, as applied by a trial court to its own prior rulings, is discretionary. Nevertheless, the trial court erred by limiting the witness’s testimony to “child psychology and forensic interviewing” without first conducting a prejudice analysis. But any error was harmless because the trial court also determined that the excluded lines of questioning were improper and the associated prejudice outweighed the probative value of the testimony.
Melara additionally contended that the court erred at the second trial by not severing the charges involving the different victims. Melara forfeited this argument. But because severance was not mandated, and rational explanations existed for why Melara may not have wanted the charges at the second trial severed, there was no error associated with the trial court’s decision not to sua sponte order severance of the charges at the second trial.
Melara also argued that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting the granddaughter’s initial disclosure and certain conversations with the daughter, and video of the granddaughter’s forensic interview. Melara further contended that the court reversibly erred by departing from the model jury instruction’s child hearsay instruction. However, the record supports the trial court’s findings that the granddaughter’s hearsay statements to the daughter and the forensic interviewer were sufficiently reliable to be admissible. The court also appropriately considered whether the granddaughter understood the difference between the truth and a lie. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by admitting the granddaughter’s out-of-court statements. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the child hearsay instruction because it limited the jury’s consideration to relevant evidence.
Lastly, Melara contended that the cumulative errors warrant reversal. Even though the court concluded that the trial court should have included the “lack of evidence” language in the reasonable doubt instruction, and it erred by relying on the incomplete nature of the expert witness’s endorsement to limit the scope of his testimony, this omission and error did not have a synergistic or compounding effect and did not substantially prejudice Melara.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.