People v. Montoya.
2025 COA 89. No. 21CA1539. Sixth Amendment—Right to Public Trial—Courtroom Closure—Proceedings via Webex—Waller Test—Failure or Refusal to Leave Premises—Barricading.
November 20, 2025
Montoya’s sister reported to law enforcement that Montoya had broken into a house. Montoya’s sister gave officers a key to the house’s front door, but it did not work because the lock was damaged, and officers noticed indications that the door had been pried open. Officers then went to the back of the house, where they saw French doors jammed shut by a two-by-four placed in the door track. They saw Montoya inside and gave him several commands to unlock the door and come outside before he left the house and was arrested. Montoya was charged with first degree criminal trespass, failure to leave the premises, and criminal mischief. Montoya proceeded to trial without counsel during the COVID-19 pandemic. The jurors were seated throughout the courtroom to allow for social distancing, and the public watched the trial via Webex, with the camera focused solely on the judge, counsel, and Montoya. Montoya was convicted of first degree trespass, criminal mischief, and failure to leave the premises under CRS § 18-9-119(2). Montoya challenged his convictions on several grounds. The court of appeals upheld the convictions, but the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rios v. People, 2025 CO 46, and People v. Bialas, 2025 CO 45. The supreme court’s remand instructions pertained only to the courtroom closure issue, but because the vacating judgment was not restricted or qualified, it effectively abrogated the entire original opinion, so the court of appeals also reiterated its analysis and conclusion on the sufficiency of evidence issue.
As an initial matter, the People argued that Montoya knew about the courtroom closure and failed to object, so he waived this issue. The court of appeals determined that this issue was not waived because Montoya filed a written objection to the courtroom closure when he found out that his case would be closed to the public, and he requested both that the proceedings be held in person and that the courthouse remain open to the public.
On the merits, Montoya argued that that the trial court completely closed the courtroom by excluding the public and requiring them to view the trial in a separate courtroom via a live audio and video stream. He also maintained that the trial court failed to make findings justifying the closure under Waller, and its failure to consider reasonable alternatives violated his right to a public trial. Under Waller, to support a nontrivial courtroom closure, (1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced if the proceeding is open to the public; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the hearing; and (4) the trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure. In Rios, the court held that a virtual platform is an additional means of access, not a substitute for public access, and a total closure occurs when a trial court conducts a trial that is exclusively virtual. But to implicate the public trial right, the closure must be nontrivial. In Bialas, the defendant’s conviction was upheld and the case remanded for a new trial because there was a nontrivial courtroom closure that was not justified by the Waller factors. Applying Rios and Bialas, a total closure occurred when the trial court physically excluded all members of the public from the courtroom and relied on the livestream as a substitute for the public’s physical presence. Further, the closure was nontrivial because it was intentional and the court excluded the public from the courtroom for the duration of the trial. Here, the first Waller factor was met because neither party requested the closure, and the trial court acted on its own, in accordance with public health guidelines and the administrative order in effect at the time of trial, out of concerns for the health of jurors and other trial participants. But the court did not explain why jury selection could not have occurred in waves to permit members of the public to observe, nor did the court reference the possible use of off-site locations. Further, though three differently sized courtrooms were available for use, the record does not reflect that the trial court contemporaneously considered using another larger courtroom so that some members of the public could attend in person. Accordingly, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings under Waller to conclude that it considered reasonable alternatives or that the closure was not broader than necessary. Therefore, the closure violated Montoya’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.
Montoya also contended that his failure to leave the premises conviction must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence to show that he used or threatened to use force to prevent law enforcement from entering the premises. Montoya asserted that § 18-9-119(2) describes only one way to commit failure to leave the premises, which must include the “use . . . or threatened use of force.” However, the plain language of § 18-9-119 provides that failure to leave the premises may be committed by either (1) barricading and refusing to leave the premises at law enforcement’s request or (2) refusing police entry by using or threatening to use force and refusing to leave the premises when asked to do so by law enforcement. Here, the record shows that when police officers arrived, they saw Montoya inside the house behind barricaded French doors and repeatedly told him to open the doors and come outside, and Montoya eventually complied and left the house only after repeated orders. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence supports Montoya’s failure to leave the premises conviction under the barricading clause of the statute. Accordingly, the prosecution may retry him on this charge.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.