People v. Page.
2026 COA 68. No. 25CA0020. Postconviction DNA Testing—Procedure for Application for DNA Testing—Denial Without Hearing—Standard of Review—De Novo.
September 3, 2026
Daniels and Schweissing were out for a run in 1992 when they were shot by a man on a motorcycle. The victims worked with an artist to create a composite drawing of the shooter, which was published to the public. Page’s mother-in-law contacted police and told them that Page owned a motorcycle and looked like the person in the sketches. Police searched the crime scene and collected cartridge casings from where the victims said the perpetrator had stood while shooting at them. Police also collected as evidence a soda can and a chimichanga wrapper from the spot where the victims said they had first seen the shooter. The items were all tested for fingerprints. No prints were found on the casings. Latent prints were found on the can and the wrapper, but they weren’t Page’s, and they have never been connected to any person. In a subsequent lineup, the victims identified Page as only a possible match to the assailant. Police arrested Page, and he later allegedly confessed to shooting the victims, but Page’s confession was neither recorded nor reduced to writing and signed or acknowledged by him. Through his trial and to this day, Page maintains that he never confessed to the shooting. But both victims positively identified Page as the shooter at trial. And the prosecution presented evidence of Page’s confession, the eyewitness identifications, and cartridge casing comparisons. Page was found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and four crime of violence sentence enhancers. Page’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal but his case was remanded for resentencing. Shortly after the 2023 amendments to Colorado’s DNA testing statute, Page petitioned for DNA testing of the cartridge casings along with a drink can and food wrapper also found near the crime scene, and latent fingerprints taken from the latter two items. He asserted that favorable results from the requested testing could show DNA from a third party and not Page on all of the items. The postconviction court denied Page’s petition without a hearing.
On appeal, Page argued that the postconviction court erred by summarily denying his petition without a hearing. In 2023, the General Assembly substantially lowered a criminal defendant’s burden to obtain an order authorizing postconviction testing of DNA evidence. Drawing parallels between Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) and CRS § 18-1-412(3), the court of appeals concluded that, when considering a petition for postconviction DNA testing, the postconviction court must apply the same standard it applies when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a Crim. P. 35(c) petition. The court held that a postconviction court may deny a defendant’s petition for postconviction DNA testing without a hearing only if (1) the defendant’s allegations are bare and conclusory; (2) the allegations, even if true, don’t establish entitlement to postconviction DNA testing; or (3) the record directly refutes the defendant’s claims. In determining the adequacy of the allegations, the postconviction court must assume that the requested testing would yield favorable results. Further, because a postconviction court doesn’t make factual findings when it denies a petition for postconviction DNA testing without a hearing, an appellate court must review a postconviction court’s summary denial de novo. Here, the postconviction court erred by denying Page’s petition without a hearing because Page made a prima facie showing that he met the criteria for postconviction DNA testing in that he sufficiently alleged a reasonable probability that he wouldn’t have been convicted if he’d had favorable DNA testing results.
The postconviction court’s order denying Page’s petition without a hearing was reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing on Page’s petition for postconviction DNA testing.