People v. Papol.
2026 COA 32. No. 24CA1349. Juvenile Court—Direct Filing in District Court—Postconviction Proceedings—Statutory Amendments—Procedural Versus Jurisdictional.
April 30, 2026
Papol was 15 years old when he sexually assaulted and murdered M.V. in 1988. The prosecution did not file charges against Papol until 2018 because the case was cold. The prosecution originally filed Papol’s case in juvenile court but dismissed it shortly thereafter, and then filed this action in district court under CRS § 19-2-805(1)(a) (1988). Papol requested a reverse-transfer hearing, which the district court denied. He then moved to dismiss his case for lack of statutory authority, arguing that the 1988 statute did not apply, and because he was 15 when the alleged offense occurred, his case had to be filed in juvenile court. Papol then pleaded guilty to second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and four crime of violence sentence enhancer counts, with a stipulated sentencing range of 40 to 60 years in prison. The district court sentenced him to 60 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections with five years of parole. In 2023, Papol filed postconviction motions for relief under Crim. P. 35(a) and (c), arguing, as relevant here, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case based on 2012 amendments to the direct file statute. The postconviction court denied the motions, reasoning that the 1988 direct file statute applied because the offense date, not the date the charges were filed, governed which statute version applied.
On appeal, Papol argued that the postconviction court erred by concluding that the 1988 version of the direct file statute applied. He asserted that the 2012 version of the statute should have applied because his case was filed in 2018 and the postconviction court erred in relying on People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, ¶ 20—which held that the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute were not ameliorative, amendatory legislation subject to retroactive application—for purposes of holding that the 1988 statute applied. The 1988 statute allowed for direct filing of charges in district court for juveniles 14 years of age or older alleged to have committed a class 1 felony. The direct file statute was amended in 2010 and 2012 to (1) increase the minimum age required for direct filing in district court to 16 years of age for juveniles alleged to have committed a class 1 or class 2 felony; (2) eliminate direct filing for juveniles 14 or 15 years old; and (3) allow a juvenile whose case was direct filed in district court to request a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether the case should be transferred to juvenile court. The court of appeals first concluded that whether the 2012 amendments apply retroactively as amendatory, ameliorative legislation is inapplicable here because, while the offense for which Papol was charged was committed in 1988, the prosecution didn’t file charges against him until after the 2012 amendments were enacted. Therefore, the default rule that legislation applies prospectively to transactions occurring after the effective date entitled Papol to the benefit of the 2012 amendments. The postconviction court thus erred by relying on Godinez to determine that the 1988 direct file statute applied. Second, the changes to the statute affected only the manner in which Papol could be charged with a criminal offense and not whether he could be charged at all, so the 2012 amendments were procedural. As a result, because Papol entered into a valid plea agreement, he waived any error committed by the district court.
Papol also argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case. He acknowledged that his case was eligible for transfer to the district court even under the 2012 statute but contended that because he did not receive a transfer hearing in juvenile court, the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over his case, and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However, any error in failing to file in juvenile court was procedural rather than jurisdictional.
The order was affirmed.