People v. Perez.

2026 COA 72. No. 23CA1487. Fifth Amendment—Due Process—Witnesses—Voluntariness of Statements—Motion to Suppress—Evidentiary Hearing—Shreck Hearing.

September 24, 2026

Gail Wilson let his daughter Savannah move into his home, along with Savannah’s then-boyfriend Perez and Perez’s friend Griffith. Perez and Gail had numerous disagreements that intensified, and Perez eventually murdered Gail in the home. Savannah witnessed the murder; Griffith did not witness the attack but saw Gail’s body. The three then removed Gail’s body and tried to conceal the crime by disposing of the evidence, including the body, in various locations. They then filed a missing person report with the police, whose investigation led to their arrest. Savannah and Griffith were interviewed separately while in custody and gave accounts of the events on the night of Gail’s murder and the subsequent coverup. In exchange for their trial testimony, the prosecution offered them pleas that included a reduction in charges and recommendations for probationary sentences. Perez was charged with first degree murder, tampering with a deceased human body, attempting to influence a public servant, and tampering with physical evidence. Perez moved pretrial to suppress Savannah’s and Griffith’s statements to the police on grounds that they were coerced due to “promises for leniency.” This coercion, he asserted, raised a factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing. The court heard argument and considered the extensive record relating to the challenged statements and found that Perez lacked standing under the Fifth Amendment to challenge the voluntariness of Savannah’s and Griffith’s statements. It then denied Perez’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder; a consecutive term of 12 years for tampering with a deceased body; and concurrent terms of five years and 18 months for attempting to influence a public servant and tampering with physical evidence, respectively.

On appeal, Perez argued that the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Savannah’s and Griffith’s statements to law enforcement were voluntary. Fifth Amendment immunity applies personally to the defendant and does not extend to other witnesses. Where a defendant claims that their statement was coerced, the factual dispute arises from a prosecutor claiming to the contrary that the statement was made voluntarily. Perez did not argue that his own statements to the police were coerced but that statements made by third parties to the police were coerced. Federal and California state courts have uniformly held that when a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a third party’s statements made to police, the claim is a due process challenge and is not covered by a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. If the third party witness does not maintain that their statement was coerced, there is not necessarily a factual dispute for the court to resolve. Rather, to require an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must allege facts raising a factual dispute showing that the witness’s statements were involuntary. But even if the defendant’s motion alleges a factual dispute, the record may support that the witnesses’ statements were made voluntarily, so the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Here, Perez did not meet his burden to show that a factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing existed because Savannah and Griffith did not claim that their statements were coerced, their interviews were videotaped, and their plea agreements were not improperly induced by law enforcement so as to render their statements involuntary. Thus, the court did not err when it denied Perez’s motions to suppress Savannah’s and Griffith’s statements without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Perez also argued the district court erred by not holding hearing under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001), to consider the reliability of expert testimony involving blood spatter and patterns. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the scientific evidence was not new or novel, Perez did not make a cognizable challenge to the expert’s qualifications, and Perez didn’t challenge the usefulness of expert’s testimony to the jury.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed.