People v. Peters.
2026 COA 24. No. 24CA1951. US Constitution—Article II—Reprieves and Pardons—Offenses Against the United States—Article VI—Supremacy Clause Immunity—Sentencing—First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Sufficiency of Evidence—Jury Instructions.
April 2, 2026
Peters was the Mesa County Clerk and Recorder in 2021 when the Office of the Colorado Secretary of State (SOS) was preparing for election management software upgrades across Colorado, including in Mesa County. Peters failed to follow SOS requirements to restrict public access to the software upgrades process by allowing unauthorized individuals access to the process. SOS employees were alerted to Peters’s actions when they discovered that screenshots of a video, including a screenshot of Mesa County’s confidential passwords from the 2021 upgrade, were posted online. An investigation into Peters and her office ensued, and Peters was later convicted of three counts of attempt to influence a public servant and one count each of conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation, first degree official misconduct, violation of duty, and failure to comply with SOS requirements. The trial court sentenced her to six months in the Mesa County jail on the misdemeanors, followed by an aggregate sentence on the felonies of eight years and three months in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
Peters appealed, and while this appeal was pending, President Trump purported to pardon her for “those offenses she has or may have committed or taken part in related to election integrity and security during the period from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021.” Peters then filed a motion to determine whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal, asserting that (1) the president’s pardon abrogates her state law offenses and (2) she is immune from state prosecution on Supremacy Clause immunity grounds. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 of the US Constitution grants the president the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” The parties appeared to agree, as did the court, that the phrase “Offences against the United States” is ambiguous. Peters argued that the phrase includes an offense against any of the states in the union. Reviewing relevant textual, structural, and historical considerations, the court concluded that the president’s pardon has no impact on Peters’s state law offenses, so it cannot and does not deprive Colorado state courts of jurisdiction.
As to the Supremacy Clause argument, federal officers are immune from state prosecutions for their reasonable and necessary actions in discharging their federal responsibilities. The court thus first assessed whether Peters is an individual to whom Supremacy Clause immunity extends. Peters did not assert that she is a federal employee or federal agent but contended that Supremacy Clause immunity extends to any individual acting pursuant to a statutory duty imposed by federal law. She maintained that she was acting pursuant to a duty imposed by 52 USC § 20701, which, as relevant here, required her to “retain and preserve” election records for 22 months. But no case authority supports extending Supremacy Clause immunity to a state officer acting pursuant to a federal statute. Therefore, as a matter of law, Peters is not an individual who can claim Supremacy Clause immunity; the Colorado state courts have jurisdiction over her prosecution; and the trial court did not err by denying her motion to dismiss the charges on Supremacy Clause immunity grounds.
Peters also contended that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of attempt to influence a public servant, conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation, and first degree official misconduct. However, ample record evidence supported these convictions.
Peters additionally asserted that the trial court deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense by excluding (1) evidence related to her statutory duty to preserve election records and her motive to preserve such records and investigate potential election fraud; and (2) evidence regarding her investigation of election fraud. Peters’s statutory duty to retain and preserve election records and her actions fulfilling that duty had no bearing on whether she engaged in the illegal conduct for which she was charged. And by their plain language, neither § 20701 nor § 20702 imposes any duty on the election official to investigate the destruction of election records. Accordingly, because the evidence Peters sought to admit had no relevance, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.
Peters further asserted that the trial court erred by denying her request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses of Supremacy Clause immunity and execution of a public duty. As discussed above, Peters was not entitled to claim Supremacy Clause immunity, so the trial court could not have erred by not instructing the jury on that defense. And because there was no evidence that Peters’s actions underlying the charges against her were related to her duty to preserve the records that were already preserved, Peters was not entitled to a jury instruction on execution of a public duty.
Peters also argued that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the indictment because it didn’t give her notice of the charges with respect to the three counts of attempting to influence a public servant. However, the charging document gave Peters more than sufficient notice of the charges.
Peters further maintained that the prosecutor violated her due process rights by misleading the jury into believing that she caused a “security breach” because her phone had photographs of passwords that later appeared online, without telling jurors that the passwords were redacted and useless. But the prosecutor’s references to a security breach were a reasonable description related to the leak of the passwords that was helpful information to the jury, so there was no error.
Peters also contended that the trial court erred by denying her request for a post-trial hearing to determine if a juror’s bias affected the verdict. However, the trial court properly determined that CRE 606(b) precluded a hearing.
Peters additionally asserted that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by misstating the evidence. But the evidence of Peters’s knowledge of the illegality of her conduct is so overwhelming that the prosecutor’s fleeting comment cannot be said to have had any impact on the verdict.
Lastly, Peters asserted that the trial court erred during sentencing because it violated her free speech rights by punishing her based on her protected speech regarding allegations of election fraud. Here, the trial court’s comments about Peters’s belief in the existence of 2020 election fraud went beyond relevant considerations for her sentencing; her offense was not her belief in the existence of election fraud but her deceitful actions in attempting to gather evidence of such fraud. And the court’s improper consideration of Peters’s protected speech to impose a longer prison sentence necessarily means the error was substantial.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The convictions were affirmed, the sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions.