People v. Ragsdal.
2025 COA 9. No. 22CA0606. Second Degree Burglary—Theft—Sentencing—Restitution—Losses Exceeding Monetary Limit of Charged Conduct.
January 30, 2025
Ragsdal unlawfully entered R.K.’s home and stole keys to R.K.’s vehicles and two sheds. He was charged with burglary and theft of $50 or more but less than $300. Before trial, Ragsdal’s counsel endorsed choice-of-evils as an affirmative defense, contending that cold weather justified Ragsdal’s unlawful entry into R.K.’s home. The trial court allowed defense counsel multiple opportunities to present an offer of proof for this defense, but the court ultimately ruled that the defense failed to present an adequate basis for pursuing the defense at trial. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that he wasn’t prepared to present the requisite offer of proof to proceed. The court denied counsel’s motion, and Ragsdal was convicted as charged. The People requested restitution of $501.92, the total cost for R.K. to replace all his missing keys and change the locks on his two sheds. While the theft level’s upper limit was $300, the evidence at trial and the restitution hearing established that R.K.’s losses from the theft exceeded $500. Accordingly, following a restitution hearing, the court ordered Ragsdal to pay $501.92 in restitution.
On appeal, Ragsdal contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. To proceed with the choice-of-evils defense, defense counsel had to show facts sufficient to support a finding by reasonable jurors that Ragsdal had a justification for unlawfully entering R.K.’s home and had pursued all other potentially viable alternatives. Defense counsel failed to make this showing. Further, defense counsel told the court that he was prepared to go to trial without the choice-of-evils defense. Accordingly, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial.
Ragsdal also argued that the trial court erred by imposing restitution for uncharged conduct because he was only charged with and found guilty of theft of $50 or more but less than $300. A court can’t impose restitution based on acquitted or uncharged conduct, but imposing restitution for theft that exceeds the monetary ceiling of the charged and convicted offense level does not violate these principles. The court of appeals concluded that restitution for theft is governed by the same principles guiding any other restitution request, so restitution covers all of the victim’s out-of-pocket expenses proximately caused by the criminal conduct for which the defendant was convicted, even if such conduct would have supported charging a higher-level offense. Here, the trial court did not impose restitution for uncharged or acquitted conduct. And the record supports the court’s conclusion that the theft Ragsdal was charged with and convicted of proximately caused R.K.’s losses consistent with the restitution imposed. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution exceeding the upper monetary limit of the theft statute Ragsdal was charged under and convicted of violating.
The judgment of conviction and restitution order were affirmed.