People v. Ramcharan.
2024 COA 110. No. 22CA0534. Unlawful Sexual Behavior—Evidence of History of False Reporting—Offer of Proof of Relevancy and Materiality—Contents of Affidavit—Jury Instruction on “Knowingly”—Requests for Substitute Counsel.
October 10, 2024
Ramcharan was charged with sexual assault on a child with a use of force enhancer and contributing to the delinquency of a minor in connection with a sexual encounter he had with 14-year-old A.M., who was a runaway from the Tennyson Center for Children. Defense counsel filed a pretrial notice of intent to admit evidence of A.M.’s previous false sexual assault reports along with an “affidavit” that he signed. The “affidavit” summarized statements of witnesses that defense counsel found in discovery materials that purportedly referred to A.M.’s false reports of sexual assault. The court concluded that defense counsel’s offer of proof was insufficient and improperly rested on hearsay. The court thus denied, without prejudice, the defense’s request for an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence of A.M.’s alleged history of false reporting of sexual assaults. The court also allowed defense counsel to refile the request, which counsel did not do. Ramcharan was convicted of sexual assault on a child and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
On appeal, Ramcharan contended that the district court reversibly erred by not allowing him to introduce evidence that A.M. made multiple false reports of being sexually assaulted. Colorado’s rape shield statute, CRS § 18-3-407(2), requires a party seeking to introduce evidence of a victim’s “history of false reporting of sexual assaults” to file a written motion and supporting affidavit containing “an offer of proof of the relevancy and materiality” of the evidence. The affidavit must state facts that, if demonstrated at the evidentiary hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, would show that the alleged victim made multiple false reports of sexual assault. Here, defense counsel’s “affidavit” was not notarized and did not expressly state that it was made “under penalty of perjury under the law of Colorado,” did not state that he had spoken with any of the witnesses named in the “affidavit,” and did not provide facts establishing that the witnesses’ statements referenced in the “affidavit” were admissible. Accordingly, defense counsel’s offer of proof failed, and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramcharan’s request to introduce evidence of A.M.’s history of false reports of sexual assaults.
Ramcharan also argued that the court reversibly erred by improperly instructing the jury on the word “knowingly,” the mens rea element for both charged offenses. The People conceded, and the court of appeals agreed, that the instruction did not entirely track the statutory definition of “knowingly” or the pattern jury instruction. Further, the instruction did not include the CRS § 18-1-501(6) language that the person is “aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result,” which is a material omission. Therefore, the court erred by incorrectly defining “knowingly.” However, while the error was obvious, it was not substantial, because the evidence against Ramcharan was overwhelming.
Ramcharan further asserted that the court reversibly erred by denying his multiple requests for substitute counsel based on an irreconcilable conflict with his counsel. Here, the alleged conflict primarily arose from Ramcharan’s mistaken belief that he could dictate his lawyers’ legal strategy, and his resulting refusal to cooperate with them, so there was no basis for appointment of new counsel. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramcharan’s requests for appointment of new counsel.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.