People v. Ramirez-Armas.

2026 COA 1. No. 23CA0338. Assault in the First Degree—Peace Officers—Amended Information—Batson Challenge—Merger of Convictions—Eighth Amendment—Proportionality Review—Per Se Grave or Serious Offenses.

January 8, 2026

Ramirez-Armas stole a truck, attempted to run over the truck’s owner and showed him a gun, and then engaged police in a vehicle chase. During the chase, Ramirez-Armas sped toward Sergeant Hammell’s vehicle at high speed, and Sergeant Hammell had to perform maneuvers to avoid a collision. The chase eventually ended when an officer performed a PIT maneuver, which caused the vehicle to crash. As relevant here, Ramirez-Armas was charged with two counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of menacing, one count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, and one count of vehicular eluding. A year before trial, the prosecution moved to amend the information to substitute first degree assault for menacing. Defense counsel opposed the motion, but the court granted it after finding that the amendment would not prejudice Ramirez-Armas. The court also allowed Ramriez-Armas’s lawyer an opportunity to supplement her prejudice argument, but she never did so. The prosecution used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror S.M. Defense counsel challenged the strike under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986), on the ground that S.M. was the sole juror with a Spanish surname. The court denied the Batson challenge after the prosecution offered a race-neutral explanation for the strike. The court then offered defense counsel two opportunities to make a further record in support of her Batson argument before it dismissed the excused jurors from the courtroom. Ramirez-Armas was convicted of aggravated robbery, first degree assault, two counts of criminal attempt to commit manslaughter, first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, and vehicular eluding. The court sentenced him to 32 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for aggravated robbery and 23 years for first degree assault, to be served consecutively, and six-year concurrent sentences for each count of attempted manslaughter, first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, and vehicular eluding.

On appeal, Ramirez-Armas argued that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to amend the information to substitute first degree assault for the original charge of menacing. He asserted he was prejudiced when the court granted the motion after he had entered a not guilty plea and because the prosecution gave no explanation or good cause for the amendment. Crim. P. 7(e) allows a court discretion to permit amendment of an information as to form or substance any time before trial. While the court may, in its discretion, consider good cause and prejudice when deciding whether to allow such an amendment, the rule’s plain language does not require the court to find good cause or lack of prejudice to the defendant before granting a motion to amend before trial. And Ramirez-Armas presented no legal support for his argument, which, when taken to its logical conclusion, would preclude courts from granting motions to amend an information any time after a defendant rejected a plea offer. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to amend.

Ramirez-Armas also contended that the court erroneously denied his Batson challenge because (1) the court did not give his counsel a sufficient opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for the strike; (2) the court deprived him of a meaningful remedy if it found a Batson violation, because it allowed S.M. to leave the courtroom before defense counsel completed her Batson argument; and (3) the court violated his constitutional right to equal protection by making “compound errors” in applying Batson, so the case must be remanded for further findings under step three of the Batson analysis. First, the court provided defense counsel with two opportunities to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking S.M., but counsel neither attempted to rebut the prosecutor’s stated reason nor asserted that the court had not provided her with a sufficient opportunity to present a rebuttal. So counsel had sufficient opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for the strike. The record does not support the second argument, because the court directed S.M. to remain in the courtroom until defense counsel said she had no further record to make in support of her Batson challenge. Accordingly, the court did not make any errors, let alone compound errors, in rejecting defense counsel’s Batson challenge, so remand for further findings under step 3 of the Batson analysis is not warranted.

Ramirez-Armas further asserted, and the People and court of appeals agreed, that the court erred by not merging his conviction for vehicular eluding into his conviction for first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft because vehicular eluding is an element of aggravated motor vehicle theft.

Ramirez-Armas additionally argued that his 23-year sentence for first degree assault under CRS § 18-3-202(1)(e) is constitutionally disproportionate. He maintained that (1) both prongs of the abbreviated proportionality review must be considered because first degree assault under subsection (1)(e) is not a per se grave and serious offense, and (2) the original charge of menacing should be considered in weighing the harshness of his sentence. To determine whether a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, the court initially considered whether the crime was per se grave and serious. While divisions of the court of appeals have held that various forms of first degree assault are per se grave and serious, the court here held for the first time that first degree assault on a peace officer is per se grave and serious. Given its conclusion that first degree assault under subsection (1)(e) is a per se grave and serious offense, the court considered the second prong of the abbreviated proportionality analysis—whether Ramirez-Armas’s sentence for that offense was unduly harsh. Here, Ramirez-Armas’s 23-year sentence fell within the statutory range. And because Ramirez-Armas was convicted of first degree assault, not felony menacing, the court evaluated the harshness of the penalty according to first degree assault. The evidence showed that Ramirez-Armas drove nearly 70 mph directly toward Sergeant Hammell’s vehicle, and Sergeant Hammell had to jump on the brake and jerk his car onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. That the last-minute maneuvers avoided a head-on crash does not lessen the seriousness of Ramirez-Armas’s behavior. Accordingly, Ramirez-Armas’s sentence for first degree assault was not constitutionally disproportionate.

The judgment of conviction was affirmed, except for Ramirez-Armas’s vehicular eluding conviction, which was vacated. The case was remanded for correction of the mittimus.