People v. Redwine.
2026 COA 82. No. 21CA1859. Murder in the Second Degree—Child Abuse Resulting in Death—Pretrial Publicity—Venue—Evidence—Expert Testimony.
November 11, 2026
On November 18, Redwine picked up his teenage son D.R. from the airport for a court-ordered visit at Redwine’s home in Vallecito. Redwine’s relationship with D.R. was strained at the time, largely because several months prior D.R. had found photos of Redwine eating feces out of a diaper while wearing women’s clothing (the photos). On November 19, Redwine notified police of D.R.’s disappearance, and authorities searched for him that evening. Redwine cooperated with law enforcement but did not participate in the search for D.R. or request updates. The case was covered in the media, including an appearance by Hall, D.R.’s mother and Redwine’s ex-wife, on the Dr. Phil television show and True Crime Radio. The Durango Herald (Herald) published over 150 articles about the case, and photos of Redwine eating feces appeared on Facebook. Law enforcement suspected Redwine and interviewed him regularly. Redwine cooperated but engaged in questionable behavior, including transferring money out of D.R.’s bank account. In June 2013, D.R.’s partial remains were found on an all-terrain vehicle trail. In August 2013, Human Remains Detection Dog Handler Corcoran and her cadaver dog Molly searched Redwine’s home, where Molly alerted to a cadaver scent in various places. In November 2015, hikers found D.R.’s skull about two miles from the first recovery site. Forensic anthropologists concluded that the skull injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma and knife wounds, ruling out that D.R. had been attacked by an animal. In July 2017, Redwine was arrested and charged with second degree murder and child abuse resulting in death. He moved pretrial to change venue based on presumed prejudice. The trial court denied the motion. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to 48 years in Department of Corrections’ custody.
On appeal, Redwine argued that the trial court erred by denying his change of venue motion, asserting that pretrial publicity affected the court’s ability to seat an impartial jury, so failing to change venue deprived him of a fair trial. Pretrial publicity by itself does not trigger a due process entitlement to a change of venue in the absence of extreme circumstances. In determining whether pretrial publicity created a presumption of prejudice, courts consider several factors, including the source of news stories, the volume and intensity of news coverage, the publication of incriminating facts inadmissible at trial, proximity to the time of the trial, the size and type of the locale, and the victim’s reputation. Here, jury selection began eight years after D.R. disappeared, and the significant passage of time decreased any potential harmful effect of publicity; Redwine could not show how many local residents read the Herald daily; and most of the hateful comments directed at Redwine came from Facebook, which reaches an international audience. Further, Redwine did not show an actual nexus between pretrial publicity and juror impartiality. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that pretrial publicity was not so pervasive as to create a presumption of prejudice.
Redwine also contended that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of specific incidents of alleged misconduct in violation of CRE 404(b). Specifically, Redwine challenged (1) the photos; (2) testimony regarding a confrontation with two women in which one woman called him “a shit eating piece of shit” and, in response, Redwine grabbed a split log and advanced toward the women; and (3) testimony from Redwine’s first ex-wife Horvath that, while on a camping trip with Redwine nearly 30 years earlier, he said that their remote camping spot would be a good place “to get rid of a body.” She explained that she remembered this statement years later because it caused her fear. Here, there was no error in admitting the photos and log incident because Redwine and D.R.’s relationship and Redwine’s possible motive for harming D.R. were material facts and the evidence was relevant to explaining their relationship. The trial court also gave the jury a limiting instruction. And though the evidence was unfavorable, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the court abused its discretion by allowing Horvath’s testimony because it summarily overruled defense counsel’s Rule 401, 402, 403, and 404 objections. But this error was harmless because it was a brief moment in a three-week trial.
Redwine further asserted that the trial court erred by admitting evidence pertaining to Molly and Corcoran as expert testimony without a proper foundation. However, the trial court did not err by admitting Corcoran’s testimony after holding a three-day hearing under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001), to determine the reliability and relevance of the proffered evidence. And the trial correctly analyzed the factors in Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1999), as modified for cadaver dogs, to determine admissibility.
Redwine additionally argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained through Molly’s warrantless search of his home, maintaining that his consent was the result of deceptive police tactics and therefore involuntary. Redwine’s argument that his consent was involuntary because police referred to Molly as a “scent dog” instead of a “cadaver dog” failed because there was no evidence that officers intentionally misled Redwine on this fact. And there was no evidence that police impaired Redwine’s ability to grant consensual access to his home. Accordingly, Redwine validly consented to the search, and the trial court did not err by denying Redwine’s motion to suppress.
Redwine further contended for the first time on appeal that the trial judge’s pervasive bias deprived him of a fair trial. Here, while the judge was at times impatient, he was maintaining courtroom order during a long trial and expediting the presentation of evidence. And the record does not suggest overt hostility. Redwine’s unpreserved judicial bias claim thus failed.
Redwine also maintained that the prosecutor made several improper comments during closing argument. However, the prosecutor permissibly argued that Redwine killed D.R. based on evidence, and the record shows that the prosecutor did not imply that Redwine was guilty because he exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial.
Lastly, Redwine asserted cumulative error. Because the trial court erred only once with respect to Horvath’s testimony, the cumulative error principle is not implicated.
The judgment was affirmed.