People v. Schlitt.
2026 COA 65 No. 24CA1331. Parks and Wildlife—Willful Destruction of Wildlife—Mens Rea—Intent to Abandon—Sufficiency of Evidence—Merger of Convictions—Jury Instructions—Constructive Amendment—Fatal Variance—Prosecutorial Misconduct.
August 20, 2026
Schlitt killed a roughly 350-pound bear while bow hunting with his brother on September 11, 2022. Although Schlitt had a valid qualifying hunting license and a bear tag valid for several game management units, he killed the bear outside a designated unit. Schlitt, his brother, and a nearby camper cut off the bear’s head, hide, and paws, and then left the carcass on some logs without field dressing it or harvesting any meat. The brothers told the camper they believed all they had to take was the meat or the hide and did not mention plans to return to harvest the meat later. The next day, Schlitt’s father called Colorado Parks and Wildlife (CPW) and said that his sons had killed a bear and taken the skin and the head, and asked if they had to collect the meat as well. After Schlitt and his brother learned about the phone call, they returned to the carcass and harvested 62 pounds of meat. Several weeks later, CPW opened an investigation based on a tip from another hunter. The CPW investigator found the bear’s carcass, noting that it had not been field dressed, had no knife marks, and had signs of scavenging indicating that edible meat had been left on the bear. The investigator searched Schlitt’s and his father’s properties and found bear meat, the bear’s trophy parts, and hunting equipment. Schlitt was subsequently found guilty of willful destruction, hunting without a license, illegal possession, and waste. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years of probation, assessed fines and costs, and determined that CPW could impose up to 35 hunting license suspension points.
On appeal, Schlitt argued that his convictions for hunting without a license and waste should be merged into his conviction for illegal possession. Separately, he contended that his conviction for waste must be merged into his conviction for willful destruction. The People conceded that merger is required for either hunting without a license or waste because the court instructed the jury that both of these offenses were predicates to illegal possession. But the People maintained that to maximize the jury’s verdict, the waste conviction should merge into illegal possession, and Schlitt’s conviction for hunting without a license should remain. Here, under the instructions given, hunting without a license and waste were lesser included offenses of illegal possession, so a merger is required. But because Schlitt’s illegal possession conviction was predicated on both waste and hunting without a license, and the jury found Schlitt guilty of all three offenses, only one offense needs be merged, since only one predicate offense is needed to support the greater offense. The court fined Schlitt more for hunting without a license than it did for waste, so merging waste with illegal possession best effectuates the jury’s verdict. Thus, Schlitt’s conviction for waste must be vacated.
Schlitt also contended that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on the willful destruction charge because he and his brother harvested meat from the bear a day or two after killing it. CRS § 33-6-117(1)(a)(I) prohibits a hunter from taking only trophy parts “with the intent to abandon the carcass.” The Colorado wildlife statutes do not define the term “abandon.” The court of appeals concluded that the statute prohibits a person from hunting wildlife with a conscious objective to collect only the trophy parts and leaving the carcass behind without intending to return. Thus, whether a hunter originally intended to take only the trophy parts and then later changed course is a question for the jury. The jury must determine whether, when the hunter killed the wildlife and took only trophy parts, the hunter had the conscious objective of leaving the carcass behind with no intent to return. Here, the evidence reasonably supports a conclusion that Schlitt intended to abandon the carcass. Accordingly, the trial court did not misinterpret the statute when denying Schlitt’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support Schlitt’s conviction for willful destruction.
Schlitt additionally asserted that the court plainly erred by allowing a constructive amendment or a fatal variance in the jury instructions for the willful destruction charge. Here, the charging document alleged that Schlitt committed willful destruction “[b]etween and including September 11, 2022, and September 13, 2022.” But the jury instructions stated that Schlitt was charged with willful destruction “on September 11, 2022,” and the elemental instruction specified that Schlitt was alleged to have committed the offense “at or about the date and place charged.” There was no constructive amendment because the difference in the time frame between the charging document and the jury instructions did not change an essential element of the charged offense. And, even if the differences in the time frame were material, the record does not suggest that Schlitt could have presented a different timeline to the jury. So any variance is not fatal because it could not have hampered Schlitt’s defense to the charge.
Schlitt also argued that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct during voir dire and closing arguments by inflaming and misleading the jury and offering a personal opinion on his guilt. Here, while statements the prosecutor made during voir dire were inartful, the prosecutor did not misstate her burden of proof or tell the jury to disregard specific details about the case, and the record does not indicate that the comments confused prospective jurors, who were later properly instructed on the law. Second, though the prosecutor improperly opined on Schlitt’s guilt and suggested that his case had undergone a “screening process,” reversal is not required because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and the context in which the screening process statements were made—in direct response to defense counsel’s closing argument—reduces their prejudicial impact.
Lastly, Schlitt argued for reversal based on cumulative error. Having identified only one trial error, the court determined that cumulative error does not apply.
The conviction for waste was vacated and the case was remanded for correction of the mittimus. The judgment of conviction was affirmed in all other respects.