People v. Stauch.
2026 COA 22. No. 23CA1067. First Degree Murder—Structural Error—Waiver—Invited Error—Juror Bias—CRS § 16-10-103(1)(b)—Challenge for Cause—Peremptory Challenges—Motion to Suppress—Scope of Search Warrant.
April 2, 2026
Stauch was charged with the brutal murder of her 11-year-old stepson, G.S., whose body was placed in a suitcase and left underneath a bridge in Florida. Stauch pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and proceeded to trial. Prospective Juror M.B. indicated that his son-in-law worked as a deputy district attorney in the same office as, and for, the elected district attorney for El Paso County, who was the prosecuting attorney in this case. Defense counsel later identified Juror M.B. among the prospective jurors he wished to challenge for cause. At the prosecutor’s request, the trial court asked Juror M.B. several follow-up questions, and based on his answers, the court instructed Juror M.B. to return the next day. Juror M.B. was not dismissed, and he deliberated in the case. Stauch was convicted of first degree murder (after deliberation), first degree murder (of a child under 12 by one in a position of trust), tampering with a deceased body, tampering with physical evidence, and multiple crime of violence sentence enhancers. The trial court sentenced Stauch to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus two consecutive sentences for the two tampering convictions.
On appeal, Stauch argued that the court structurally erred when it denied her challenge for cause to Juror M.B. The attorney general asserted that Stauch did not properly preserve her challenge for cause because defense counsel did not explicitly cite CRS § 16-10-103(1)(b); and defense counsel’s comments after making the challenge for cause suggest that the challenge was based on Juror M.B.’s actual bias (subject to rehabilitation), not his implied bias based on his relationship to the prosecutor. Section 16-10-103(1)(b) provides that a juror related within the third degree to any deputy district attorney in the elected district attorney of record’s office, regardless of whether the deputy district attorney appeared or participated in the case, must be removed. Under People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 33, when a juror is challenged for cause, the trial court must excuse them because, except as described in subsection (1)(j), they cannot be rehabilitated. And when a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and a biased juror serves on the jury, the error is structural and requires reversal. Here, defense counsel’s initial challenge for cause succinctly stated that Juror M.B. was related to the prosecutor; counsel did not argue that Juror M.B. might have actual bias in favor of the prosecution. Further, the prosecutor and trial court expressly acknowledged and dismissed the possibility of a statutory challenge based on the relationship itself. Accordingly, even without defense counsel’s specific reference to § 16-10-103(1)(b), the trial court was on notice of the particular ground for the challenge. Additionally, defense counsel’s ongoing objection to Juror M.B. suggests there was no waiver of the error. And because the law does not require criminal defendants to use peremptory challenges to preserve an unsuccessful challenge for cause, defense counsel neither waived nor invited the error by not using a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror M.B. On the merits, the trial court erroneously denied the challenge to Juror M.B., who then deliberated. The error is structural, so Stauch’s convictions must be reversed.
Stauch also contended that the court erred by denying her request to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone pursuant to an overbroad warrant. She maintained that the warrant was overbroad because it let police access anything on her phone with no temporal limitations. However, the warrant specifically incorporated the warrant application and supporting affidavit that, when read together, limited the search of Stauch’s cell phone to a specific time frame, victim, and type of criminal activity. The warrant thus targeted specific data that allowed police to establish Stauch as a suspect. The motion to suppress was thus properly denied.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.